Is the US Still a Hegemonic Power?

-Written by AJ Reibel, MIR program, New Zealand

When discussing the notion of hegemony, there is an important distinction to make between international hegemony, or dominance, and internal hegemony. Internal hegemony refers to the maintenance of power structures by a particular class. Gramsci mentions the bourgeoisie class as the beneficiaries of the fruits of hegemony. What we are interested in, though, is the first notion of hegemony. Since we are addressing the question of whether or not the United States is a hegemonic power, we need to understand hegemony as international dominance. The United States, in this regard, has been (and continues to be) a hegemonic power.

American hegemony stems, as Gramsci and Cox explain, from its domestic interests. Domestic interests, which result in a country’s international interests, mirror the interests of a dominant class within the state’s society. In this way, Gramsci proposed that a historic bloc exists “[with] a hegemonic social class.”[1] As a result, the dominant class in a country directs the identity and “propagation of a common culture”[2] that the country, in turn, projects on the international scene.

The common culture, identity, and interests established by a dominant bloc within a country are evident at the international level. However, at the domestic level, they are much less obvious. For example, within the United States, one would say that Texan oil families wield substantial power. Similarly, however, Northern California IT families, Hollywood families, Midwestern brewing families, and the East-coast banking families also wield significant power. No one single bloc establishes an all-encompassing culture, identity, and interest within the US.

Nonetheless, when an administration – strongly supported by a particularly powerful bloc – comes into office, it projects the interests, culture, and identity of a specific domestic bloc as the state’s concerns, ethos, and personality. This has happened with the Bush family dynasty. The administration of George W. Bush has projected the culture and interests of the Texan oil families as inherent American concerns and philosophy.

At the international level, where does this American hegemony stem from? The United States has only become a hegemonic power in the last century. Although Cox points to a “third period” of hegemony, starting in 1945 with the end of the Second World War, as central to the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power[3], its ascent began around the turn of the 20th century. American power grew as a result of its defeat of the Spanish Empire during the Spanish-American War.

With the American victory, the government became more interested in events outside of its territory. Despite accusations of being disinterested in Europe, American administrations pursued strategic policies throughout Central and South America – rationalising that Latin America was naturally the backyard of the United States.

The United States built up its armed forces, self-esteem, and a psyche that allowed it to assert itself. Only then, did it feel comfortable getting involved in conflicts in the Old World. With its victorious experience after the First Great War and its ensuing economic surge, the US emerged as an un-contested hegemonic power. American military and economic dominance during the years of the Second World War served simply to solidify the fact that the US had surpassed Old World states in power and economic capacity. As a result, it was universally accepted that the US emerged as the international hegemon in 1945.

The most credible challenge to American economic dominance ensued between the 1960s and 1970s. Cox points out that “…the possible assertion of a Third-World-based counterhegemony with the concerted demand for the New International Economic Order…” constituted the largest challenge to American hegemony.[4] The NIEO called for Western payouts to developing states for the degenerative effects of colonialism, increases in technical and financial assistance, favourable trade agreements for developing states, and a regulation of foreign commercial interests in the developing world.[5]

It must be noted that Cox, following Gramasci’s Neo-Marxist political ideology, works to explain the likely possibility of a hegemonic-shift along class lines and facilitated by domestic civil society and global civil society organisations. As a result, he stresses the importance of the NIEO.

The overall result of the NIEO challenge, however, was not paradigm-altering. It simply resulted in a reformulation of economic policies by the US and its major Western and Asian economic allies. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were granted some preferential trading rights, received injections of Official Development Aid (ODA), and saw limited amounts of their debt cancelled. Gramsci referred to this type of absorption and adoption of “…potentially counter-hegemonic ideas…” as transformismo.[6] The United States and its “second-rank [supporting] countries”[7] effectively countered the assault of the NIEO by emphasising its divisive and antagonistic properties.

The United States has been adept at utilising international institutions to continually entrench its economic hegemony, even in the face of calls for reform or alternative international economic systems. By establishing and controlling institutions such as the World Bank, the UN Security Council, the WTO, and supporting the participation of its allies in institutions such as the G8 and the IMF, the United States has “...ideologically legitimate[d] the norms of the world order..., co-opted the elites from peripheral countries and, [by establishing a forum such as the UN General Assembly, by which powerless states can air their complaints, the institutions have] ... absorb[ed] counter-hegemonic ideas.”[8]

Because international institutions are not linked to popular political bases, Cox is hopeful that grassroots civil society organisations, through international exchanges, will bring about a paradigmatic shift.[9] Cox explains that the hegemonic order creates a large class of disadvantaged within the “core countries” and it is this class that may bring about a change in the international order. According to Cox, the change will occur by creating a “...broad alliance...against the sectors of capital and labour which find common ground in international production and the monopoly-liberal world order.”[10]

More likely is the rise of a competitor state with a rival vision of a hegemonic world order. It is likely that, with the over-accumulation of capital that has severely weakened the US within its own hegemonic system, China will ascend as the economically dominant state on the international stage. With its drive to “...absorb [its] vast labour surpluses by debt-financed investment in huge mega-projects...”[11] and a rapidly growing consumerist class, China is likely to survive the instability of the US Globalisation paradigm.

However, until China establishes or fully co-opts American-established international institutions and coerces the US’s second-rank supporting countries into joining its rival economic system, it will not become the dominant power on the world scene. Of course, all hegemonic states have seen their influence and power wane and the same will happen to the US. Until another state supplants the US economic system with a more powerful one, American dominance on the international stage remains uncontested. Despite its losses in Iraq, virulent anti-Americanism throughout many regions of the world, and potentially hostile military powers, the US remains a hegemonic power.

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[1] Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1983):168.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 170.
[4] Ibid., 171.
[5] Edmund Jan Ozmanczyk, “The New International Economic Order Requested by Developing Countries,” in Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, Third Edition, Vol. 1 A-F (New York: Routledge, 2003), 528.
[6] Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” 173.
[7] Ibid.,” 172.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 173.
[10] Ibid., 174.
[11] David Harvey, “Capital Bondage,” in the New Imperialism (____: Oxford University Press, 2003), 123.