Back to the Cold War?

Should the West be concerned about Russia’s Increasingly Assertive Foreign Policy?
-Written by AJ Reibel, MIR program, New Zealand

Preface

As Russian reinforcements surged into Georgia’s break-away Southern Ossetia region in early August 2008 Western military and political strategists seemed taken by surprise. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has not acted as directly – and militarily – against a Western ally[2]. The resurgence of hostilities between Southern Ossetia paramilitary forces, with support from their Russian allies, and Georgian forces, with nominal support from their NATO and American allies, underscored an issue that Western strategists have grappled with since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Namely, is Russia becoming openly hostile towards the West? Many strategists have dismissed the question and have focused instead on the reasons behind the rift between Russia and the West. Is Russia trying to assert itself as a great power on the world stage or merely trying to safeguard its fundamental regional geopolitical interests? More specifically, are there signs that second Cold War is possible? 

Specialists in East-European and Caucuses studies have pointed to a shift in Russian strategic and military policy since Putin’s rise to power in 1999.[3] Putin was appointed as acting president, in the aftermath of a rash of deadly bombings across Russia[4], as an enfeebled Boris Yeltsin handed the reins of the executive over to a relatively unknown former head of Russia’s intelligence agency.[5]  

After Putin’s ascension to power, Russia initiated a phase of hard-hitting policy aimed at countering the wave of terrorism facing the troubled state. Putin was determined to demonstrate to his citizens that Russia would not be terrorised by separatist elements, nor would it allow a further deterioration of its economic and military power.

Here emerges the first question regarding Putin’s new policy direction. Was Putin trying to regain Russia’s past glory? In a speech given on April 25th, 2005, he admitted that “…the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”[6] In a further series of speeches between 2004 and 2005, Putin explained that the once mighty Soviet Union – at its zenith able to defend its territory with impunity – now reduced to the Russian Federation, was unable to protect its citizens from poorly armed terrorist elements from the state’s peripheral regions. He summarised Russia’s battered psyche in a neo-realist context by explaining to his countrymen that “...[we, Russia] showed ourselves to be weak… [and] the weak get beaten.”[7]

Putin’s description of Russia as a vulnerable state calls to mind the Athenian reply to the Melians, during the Peloponnesian War of 431-404 BCE, in which the Athenians explained that “…the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”[8] In this sense, Putin suggested that while Russia was in a weakened state, internal and external actors would actively seek to further undermine its capabilities and security. Although Putin referred to the 2004 terrorist attacks on a school in Beslan, by explaining that “[states that] reason… that Russia still remains one of the world’s major nuclear powers, and still [pose] a threat to them,”[9] he insinuated that hostile great powers will work to further weaken Russia.

It is likely that Putin’s government aimed to solidify its position as a great power after the devastating and humbling 1990s. Janusz Bugajski, from the centrist Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains that the Kremlin’s strategy has been to “deepen… its dominance over [its] near neighbors and former satellites, an area the Kremlin views as a strategic extension of Russian territory.”[10] As the ongoing confrontation between Russia and Georgia over the status of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia demonstrates, Russia is willing to extend its ‘protection’ to populations seen as loyal to Russia. This protection is not purely a matter of defending “the rights of Russians abroad,” but also a way of ensuring that Russia maintains its “place in the modern world [and within its previous sphere of influence]”.[11]

During the Putin-Medvedev administration, Russia’s foreign policy has becoming increasingly assertive, in contrast to Yeltsin’s transparent foreign policy. There are many reasons for this apparent shift in policy. However, in order to reveal the mood swing occurring within the Kremlin, it is essential to contrast the rhetoric and policies emanating from the Kremlin during the Yeltsin years and those produced under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. 

To properly assess Russia’s foreign policy objectives and directives a pragmatic approach based on structural realist assumptions is necessary. My argument for a rational and guarded strategy in the face of growing Russian assertiveness includes the three following components outlined below:
1. Part I
a. an introduction of theoretical assumptions necessary to examine Russian foreign policy,
b. the identification of the two divergent analytical camps that seek to characterise Russian strategy;
2. Part II
a. an examination of Russia’s transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
b. an evaluation of domestic and foreign pressures on the insecure Russian state;
3. Part III
a. a conclusion regarding the existence of a ‘New Cold War’,
b. strategies that will help the West effectively deal with an assertive Moscow.

PART I

Approach 

Realism, with its emphasis on man’s power-seeking and security-conscious outlook, and its systemic progeny of Structural Realism are the most appropriate ideologies for understanding Moscow’s foreign strategy formulation. As Kenneth Waltz points out in his article, “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, the threat of war between states is very real – despite the prevalence of nuclear weaponry. Waltz paraphrases Immanuel Kant in his assertion that anything can lead to a conflagration.[12] In keeping with structural realism’s key assumptions, Waltz argues that a state has the right to a) expect a sudden outbreak of hostilities with another powerful state, b) consider democracies potential enemies just as it would non-democracies and, c) pursue a security strategy independent of that of other states.[13]

Waltz points out two important assumptions that structural realists hold. Firstly, he explains dismisses the idea of a Democratic Peace by explaining that democracies undermine each other’s power-bases and actively target less democratic states.[14] Secondly, Waltz explains that in an increasingly interconnected world, interdependent states automatically relinquish a degree of power to a state that they depend more on than the state in question depends on them.[15] This core assumption – along with neo-realism’s other rational assumptions that maintain that the world is a dangerous place where state actors seek to maximise relative power vis-à-vis their competitors, war is highly likely, and the only way for a state to secure itself is for it to develop a strong deterrent and act to increase its power and influence whenever possible – has meant that Moscow sees its power undermined by an unfavourable interdependent relationship. As a result, Russia (like other states with a structural realist outlook) sees the need to develop an independent and self-confident foreign policy with enough hard power to deter competitors from openly undermining its power-base.

In addition to establishing a structural realist framework by which to examine Russian foreign policy directives, I will distinguish between two significant strategic analysis camps. The first camp perceives Russia as a threat to the West while the second maintains that Russia does not yet threaten the West. Robert C. Tucker, Katja Mirwaldt, and Vladimir I. Ivanov contend that since the most significant external threat to Moscow is its potential loss of political, military, and economic influence vis-à-vis its competitors. Mirwaldt and Ivanov, in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, point out that Russia’s major concerns comprise a triumvirate of “...US unilateralism, NATO expansion, [and the] [c]ircumvention of the UN Security Council...”[16] Mirwaldt and Ivanov’s warnings, infused with Tucker’s Cold War demonization of a Marxist Moscow, urge the West to be suspicious of Sino-Russian relations.[17]

Henry Hale, Rein Taagepera, and Hannes Adomeit, some of the leading academics and strategists that are associated with the ‘Russia is not a threat’ camp, consider the opposing camp’s arguments simplistic and alarmist. In his article, titled “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs”, Adomeit discounts simplistic explanations of ethnic resentment or of Russia’s “hurt pride” and “inferiority complexes” among Russian policymakers as reasons for Moscow’s irregular and unpredictable foreign policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[18] Hale and Taagepera, in “Russia: Consolidation or Collapse?”, carry on the study of Russia beyond simply predicting that Moscow will engage with the West again, but state that it may eventually fully open itself to Western investment, institutions, norms, and liberal democracy. Furthermore, they stress that by discussing Russia’s inevitable decline and partition, its rapid and unstable disintegration may become a reality.[19] As a result, they discount that Russia’s rapid demise as a valid strategic consideration.

Although the debate between whether or not Russia threatens the West is a valid one, it fails to forecast and chart out a pragmatic course of action for dealing with the Kremlin. Edward Lucas importantly expands the discussion on an assertive Russia. Nonetheless, he draws a misleading conclusion by suggesting that, if the West fails to wake-up to a Russian danger, Moscow may emerge triumphant. His alarmist publication, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, presents the dangerous and misleading idea that the West is engaged in another irreconcilable standoff with Moscow.

PART II

The Yeltsin and Putin Years

Both internal and external Kremlin policies have evolved since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Boris Yeltsin was instrumental in laying the groundwork for post-Soviet Russia. Yeltsin, who began his political career as an official in the Yekaterina construction industry, rose to prominence in Russian politics after his appointment as first secretary of Sverdolovsk province and representative of the Ural Mountain province at the Central Committee of the (Communist) Party in Moscow.[20] Through skilful politicking, Yeltsin secured the post of Moscow Party Secretary, a post that opened his eyes to the severe “…limitations and… unintended consequences of [Mikhail] Gorbachev’s reforms.”[21] Despite his criticism of Gorbachev’s perestroika policies, in June of 1991, Yeltsin was able to win the presidency of the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic (at the time, one of the republics was under the overall direction of the USSR).[22] Yeltsin’s soaring popularity helped him resist the unsuccessful coup attempt of the summer of 1991 and, ultimately, cement his position as the first president of the newly independent Russia.[23]  

Under Yeltsin’s new government, Russia mainly focused on threats to its economy. The National Security Concept, signed by Yeltsin in December 1997, outlined that “…the operative threats to Russia [lay] not in the international system, but in Russia’s internal conditions… [namely,] economic decline, instability, and societal problems.”[24] Furthermore, Yeltsin identified the solutions to Russia’s most pressing challenges as continuing economic and political reform, stability, and development[25] – indicators of a period of relative economic and security cooperation between Russia and the United States.

Yeltsin’s administration projected a schizophrenic foreign policy. Kremlin policymakers tried to “mix [both] statist and liberal ideas and interests” by insisting that Russia work cooperatively with the international community and that its economy be included in neo-liberal free-market organisations, while at the same time demanding that Russia be recognised as a great power with an independent foreign policy.[26] Paul Kubicek, a specialist in post-Communist politics and Central Asian affairs, points to the fluctuating Russian policies.[27]  
Since 1991, its general pattern has swung from one of cooperation with the West to one of direct confrontation over issues such as Bosnia, NATO expansion, and Russia's assertion of a sphere of influence in other post-Soviet states.[28] 
As Russia found itself with an enfeebled economy and a society mired in despair, Yeltsin’s government was forced to adopt Western economic models and agree to neo-liberal economic adjustments. The battered Russian economy went through a period of increased poverty and seemingly insoluble social disintegration. People’s savings vanished; a gulf emerged between rich and poor (a shocking aspect of capitalism that few citizens of the Soviet Union had been fully exposed to); factories closed down; and, a select few made fortunes while the majority of the populace seemed destined to starve to death.[29] Russians mocked the government’s catchphrases of the decade, democratiya and privatisatsiya, and instead substituted them with the following: dermokratsiya (shit-o-cracy) and prikhvatisatsiya (pirate-isation).[30]

Throughout the years of economic vulnerability, Russia was unable to assert itself as the ‘great power’ that its statesmen insisted it was. In the eyes of the populace, the state seemed impotent in the face of mounting violent and corporate crime and was seen as unable to provide basic security to its citizens.[31] As Yeltsin and his political supporters looked to the West for examples of democratic reform and neo-liberal free-market policies, foreign policy issues that might have proven a thorn in the side of Russian-Western relations were sidelined, ignored, or compromised. These included NATO expansion, the pursuit of hydrocarbon concessions, and democratisation within former Soviet republics. 

Russia’s only prominent foreign policy positions during the Yeltsin years focused on its near-abroad – an area comprised of the former Soviet Republics and satellite states. Yeltsin’s administration opposed NATO air strikes on Serbian positions during the Balkans War; supported the imposition of an arms embargo on Serbian, Croat, Bosnian, and Serbian forces; exerted politico-military pressure (by way of its ‘peacekeeping missions’) on Tajikistan[32]; intervened on behalf of Abkhazian separatists in their war against Georgia and then later intervened in order to halt a counter-coup aimed at overthrowing Eduard Shevardnadze[33]; allowed its forces to engage Moldovan troops and aid Trans-Dniester forces; and tied its withdrawal of Russian forces from Estonia to an agreement with the country’s government after protesting that Estonia was perpetrating a campaign of ethnic discrimination against its ethnic Russians.[34] Although Hannes Adomeit attributes these examples to Russia’s neo-imperialist revival[35], these actions supported the Kremlin’s neo-realist aims to maximise its relative power and ensure its influence over its former territories under the guise of ensuring stability in the CIS region (considered by the Kremlin to be its near-abroad).

During the Yeltsin years, despite Russia’s posturing along its borders, the Kremlin was not fully able to pursue its interests beyond its defenceless near-abroad. The West’s relative apathy towards the Kremlin’s manoeuvrings in Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia, Estonia, and Latvia invited a nominal level of Russian manipulation. Moreover, Russia’s foreign actions during the Yeltsin years were a blip in a policy centred on cooperation and integration with Western economic and institutional organisations. The desire to ‘westernise’ Russia was a knee-jerk reaction to the tumult of the Soviet decline and was an attempt to keep the Russian economy afloat during a period of dwindling economic productivity and alarming social deterioration.

The Yeltsin years were necessary as they allowed for a transition to a free-market economic model. Nonetheless, as the country tried to recover from the shock of the sudden collapse of the Soviet system, it was brought to its knees and to the brink of disintegration. Vladimir Putin was Yeltsin’s answer to a decade that promised increased freedoms and economic security for average Russian families but that, instead, saw the rise of powerful organised crime syndicates, the evaporation of average families’ savings, and widespread government bungling, combined with rampant corruption.  

Putin was favoured as Yeltsin’s predecessor after a tumultuous period in which Yeltsin cut short the political aspirations of former protégés. Ironically, Putin’s initial months in office were unimpressive. However, he quickly found his composure after the presidential election in March 2000.[36]  

Strategists predicted that Putin would move in one of three possible directions: a) he would remain an unimpressive and timid president without much real power; b) he would manage to pull off the near impossible by reforming the Russian economy, re-establishing order and stability, and reducing the power of corporate oligarchs who made fortunes during the decade of instability[37]; or, c) he would return Russia to its authoritarian past.[38]

Putin’s leadership broke with Yeltsin’s jovial, yet misguided, and often uncouth style. His cold, sober, and serious public persona contrasted with Yeltsin’s political insincerity, notorious drunken behaviour, and poor health. In an example of public approval of their hardworking and a ‘morally virtuous’ president, a Russian pop group, called Singing Together, released a chart-topper that had the following lyrics: 
  “I want a man who doesn’t drink, doesn’t smoke and doesn’t beat me. I want a man like Putin.”[39]
Putin was seen as the responsible and paternal guardian of the state. Furthermore, his political formulation and KGB career helped endear him to a people tired of anarchy and hardship.  

In Putin’s mind, the most pressing danger to the Russian Federation lay in its disintegration. His response, however, was quite different to Yeltsin’s. In a sequence akin to that of a Hollywood political action drama, a series of bombings between August 31st and September 16th, 1999, killed 277 people in Moscow and peripheral regions.[40] Immediately, the Kremlin’s investigators blamed Chechen separatists for the terrorist attacks, and Putin vowed to “wipe-out” the terrorists.[41] It is interesting to note that Mr. Trepashkin, himself a former FSB officer that investigated the 1999 bombings, concluded that the FSB was behind the attacks and that the Kremlin managed to manipulate public sentiment and divert attention away from its intelligence services.[42] Consequently, Mr. Trepashkin was imprisoned for 3 years for voicing his opinion. He claims to have been threatened to keep him from divulging more information regarding alleged FSB involvement in the poisoning of Alexander Litvenenko.[43]  

Despite creating an atmosphere of paranoia and a sense that the population was under siege, the Kremlin’s firm response solidified public sentiment behind Putin. Putin managed to strengthen a ‘Russian’ identity – especially a sense of an identity under attack by dangerous and criminal foreigners. Moreover, he declared that “…[a major] reason [that Russia was] fighting in Chechnya was precisely because of the danger of state collapse…” and that its soldiers were not only protecting Russian honour, but also “putting an end to the disintegration of Russia.”[44] 

On the home-front, Putin set about breaking the stranglehold that private interests had on the Kremlin. His administration managed to “[subordinate] to the state’s writ the oligarchs… and [place] much of their assets under state control.”[45] In addition to crushing internal private-sector resistance to his leadership, Putin strengthened the state’s arm by asserting its control over criminal elements active in the national economy. Mafia syndicates went into legitimate business and consented to the Kremlin’s direction, were quickly dismembered and their leaders shipped-off to Russian penal colonies in Siberia, or fled abroad. Despite Putin’s curtailing of democratic freedoms, his approval rating was astronomical. Edward Lucas points out that in a newspaper poll conducted in 2007, only 30% of respondents believed that there was a need for opposition parties and that the Kremlin’s policies could be modified.[46]

Just as Putin’s rigid and officious administration broke with Yeltsin’s inept and laissez-faire domestic policies, Putin’s foreign policies also diverged from those of his predecessor. High-level Russian strategists decided that Russia’s path to stability, economic productivity, and territorial integrity lay not in acquiescing to the West but in carving-out an independent and neo-realist path – even if it meant challenging Western interests for the good of Russia. Putin stated, in his last official interview as Russian President, that, although Russia was not interested in a return to a Cold War standoff with the US, “[the Kremlin had] the right to fight for [Russian] interests in the same way as [Russia’s] partners [had pursued their self-interest].”[47]

Furthermore, Putin’s Kremlin was wary of external threats aimed at undermining Russia’s ability to strengthen itself “...as a centre of influence in the multipolar world.”[48] Russian military and foreign policy strategists viewed pre-emption, military approaches, and unilateral actions as vital policy choices paramount to fulfilling their respective security objectives.[49] Russia’s currently independent foreign policy – driven by a desire to maximise relative power and protect its interests in the near abroad – reveals the Kremlin’s neo-realist (yet not necessarily expansionist) strategic mindset.  

The Russian public seems to support the Kremlin’s interest-maximising strategies, especially when self-interest is cloaked in national ideals and values. Lucas points out that “…when [ordinary Russians] see their president being tough with the West, they feel proud.”[50] The Kremlin portrays its interventions and policies towards its ‘near east’ as necessary in order to ensure regional security and to protect minority groups (often Russian-speaking) in countries such as Estonia or territories like Southern Ossetia. President Dmitri Medvedev explained Russian policy towards Georgia on the evening of the 8th of August, 2008, he “invoked Russia’s historical role as ‘guarantor of security’ in the Caucasus.”[51]

Although Russia’s rhetoric towards the West has changed since the tumultuous and uncertain years under Yeltsin and despite calls to the contrary emanating from Washington, Russia does not wish to actively engage the West in a war – neither along ideological nor geostrategic lines. So, why then is Putin’s/Medvedev’s Russia seen as increasingly assertive and confrontational towards the West?  

Western Actions and Russian Reactions

To see why Russia is viewed as a potential aggressor and increasingly hostile actor by the West, it is necessary to trace Russia’s defensive reactions to Western policies. Why does the West provoke the Kremlin by encroaching into its near-abroad and expect it to remain docile? There are three significant fears that the Kremlin harbours regarding Western strategy: a) the diminution of Russia’s hydrocarbon hegemony; b) the ongoing eastern extension of NATO; and, c) the installation of counter-missile defences near Russia’s western border and within its strategic buffer-zone, its near-abroad.  

[52]

Russia’s newfound and independent policy is tied to its economic stability and growth. Despite impressive economic figures, a large portion of the Kremlin’s revenue comes from the oil, gas, and mineral sectors. According to the CIA World Factbook, “…oil, natural gas, metals, and timber account for more than 80% of exports and 30% of government revenues.”[53] As world demand (and the price) for hydrocarbons soars, Russia has been able to add foreign reserves to its Central Bank’s coffers. It accumulated roughly $48 billion in 2002, $37 billion in 2001, $28 billion in 2000, and $12.5 billion in 1999.[54] In order for Russia to maximise its oil and gas reserves (and the reserves of the states in its near abroad) it is necessary for the Kremlin to control the gas and oil pipelines that transport hydrocarbons to lucrative European markets. Any private or foreign government effort to circumvent Russian pipelines is a threat to Russian economic interests.  

The United States, key European allies, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and a handful of investors backed a pipeline project to transport Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Europe via Turkey. The major private investors comprise the following state-owned oil companies: State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Stateoil (the Norwegian state-owned oil company), and Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).[55] While the following comprise the list of privately owned companies: British Petroleum (BP), ChevronTexaco, Total, Eni/Agip, Itochu, ConocoPhillips, Inpex, Amarada Hess, Exxon Mobil, and Devon Energy.[56] The project is known as the Baku-T'bilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. It skirts Russian territory while it transports gas and oil from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.[57] The pipeline, built at a cost of $3 billion, transported 850,000 barrels per day (bpd) before it was shut down when recent hostilities broke out in Georgia.[58] As a result, Azerbaijani oil has been diverted through Russia and is being transported by railroad to the Russian Caspian Sea oil port of Novorossiysk. Furthermore, Russian forces have largely cut off Georgia’s railroad network, and by doing so, simultaneously prevented oil transport contingency plans to Georgian Caspian Sea ports.[59] 

[60]

The recent conflagration between US-trained Georgian forces and a combination of the Russian 58th Army, Southern Ossetia militias, and ad-hoc paramilitary forces seems to have caught the international media, preparing for an Olympic spectacle on a record-shattering scale, by surprise. Given what is at stake for the Kremlin, Western strategists should hardly have been surprised by Russia’s massive military drive into Southern Ossetia in order to counter what President Medvedev called, “[a] barbaric [act of] aggression by the Georgian authorities” and hinder the exportation of gas through infrastructure beyond the Kremlin’s control.[61]

Washington is unsettling both Moscow and Beijing as it pursues a strategy to open-up Central Asian markets and access the region’s energy supplies. In their article, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security”, Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L. P. Swanstrom explain that since “…the United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan [and is concerned about] the development of alternative sources of energy,” the US and its Western allies find themselves “…increasingly dependent on the continued stability and development of the Central Eurasian region.”[62] Russia has reason to worry about an American encroachment into another gas and oil-rich region that it virtually has locked into its energy cartel.[63] In order to try to force the United States out of the region, the Kremlin has moved to strengthen its security ties with Central Asian states under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).  

A second important threat perceived by the Kremlin is NATO’s eastward expansion. Putin initially made overtures to NATO (including closing an eavesdropping radar station in Lourdes, Cuba and its naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam)[64]; however, his tune quickly changed as the Kremlin saw the organisation’s eastern expansion plans. His policy change has been based on NATO’s intention to offer states in the near-abroad an umbrella of Western security, while initiating closer economic cooperation with the United States and the EU. This is another factor in the tense Moscow-Tblisi standoff. If arresting Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations is too far a stretch, then the Kremlin hopes to at least, “…dissuade NATO from approving a Membership Action Plan [MAP] for Georgia at the alliance’s December 2008 or April 2009 meetings.”[65] In the short term, Kremlin geostrategic planners hope to “…derail the North Atlantic Council’s assessment visit to Georgia, scheduled for September, or at least to influence the visit’s assessment about Georgia’s eligibility for a MAP.”[66] 

Thirdly, the Kremlin has repeatedly pointed to the American policy double-standard: Bush’s insistence that Russia is a good friend, while blindly pursuing Washington’s interests in Russia’s neighbourhood at the expense of Russia’s regional influence. Putin has repeatedly insisted that NATO’s inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine is redline and unacceptable to his government.[67] Not only did the Kremlin react furiously over “[Washington’s] support for the independence of Kosovo,” but it views Washington’s plans to build a tracking radar installation in the Czech Republic and an interceptor missile facility in Poland as detrimental to its own missile capabilities.[68] Victor Kremenyuk, the deputy director of the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, “…says the U.S. was unduly provocative in the way [it] set up anti-missile [defences] in Russia's backyard.”[69]

Despite the Kremlin’s apparent alarm over the burgeoning economic development of several states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the Kremlin has more reason to be wary of NATO expansion and the positioning of missile defence installations in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Bush administration has repeatedly stated that the installations would be aimed at neutralising a missile attack from Iran. Moscow has suggested that, if Washington is serious about counteracting Iranian capabilities, it should site its installations in Azerbaijan.[70] The Kremlin maintains that the American rejection of the Azerbaijani option proves that Washington’s strategy is, in fact, to counteract Russian capabilities. For this reason, the Kremlin has questioned Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s announcement that the anti-missile system will remain transparent to Moscow.  

Russia has reason to be concerned about the growing Western influence around its eastern and southern borders. However, Russia has not been idle. The Kremlin has worked within a neo-realist framework in order to counter what it sees as growing American power. It has continued to sell lucrative weapon systems to its friendly client-states – Iran, China, Syria, and Venezuela[71] – while cooperating with the emerging Chinese power. Additionally, Russia has resumed regular strategic bomber flights beyond its borders.[72] Recent comments made by Leonid Ivashov, the former director of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s Department for International Cooperation, have sparked fears of a return to the Cold War Cuban Missile standoff by stating that the Kremlin may counter Western encirclement with “…military presence abroad, including in Cuba.”[73]

It is easy for the media and Western capitals to point to assertive rhetoric and policies emerging from the Kremlin; however, Western action has been interpreted as a menace to Russian strategic interests. Nonetheless, the cause of Russian assertiveness is not solely based on Western actions and strategies; domestic pressures also weigh heavily on Kremlin strategic thought.

Domestic Forces

Domestic opinion has played an integral role in Putin’s and Medvedev’s policies. Although Putin’s nostalgia for past Soviet glory mines a deep vein of popular sentiment, it is surprising to most foreign observers. Nevertheless, “…most Russians feel that the Soviet Union was a time of great national achievement,” and do not comprehend how Western populations can think otherwise.[74] Perhaps most striking is the fact that “…more than 60% [of young Russians] agree with their [former] president that [the Soviet Union’s] collapse was a catastrophe.”[75]

Sergei Blagov, a specialist in the CIS, points out that a majority of Russians have misgivings about NATO intentions and see NATO expansion as “…a danger to Russian interests.”[76] Domestic mistrust of the West’s intentions does not simply signal that Russia will look to make common cause with other possible Western rivals. In light of Western media attention on Russia’s growing dismay at Western strategy and, as a result, a growing closeness to China, Yu Bin, a Senior Fellow at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies, explains that a 2007 survey found a majority of Russians also view China “...as the second ‘potential enemy’ [to their state].”[77] 

It is no secret that virulent xenophobia and extreme nationalism are becoming more pronounced within Russian society. The reasons for the rise in nationalist (and ultranationalist) organisations and racial intolerance are multipart. Firstly, the Russian population is contracting while the state’s hydrocarbon-driven economy continues to attract immigrant labour. The mounting influx of foreigners, combined with a rapidly shrinking ethnic Slavic Russian population (estimated to by 100 million by 2050)[78], has stoked fear among segments of the Russian population. Russian media sources regularly decry Russia’s depopulation and announce that “the demographic catastrophe has arrived” or that “Russia is dying out!”[79]

What is striking about the overall Russian population is its general lack of well-being. Dmitri Trenin, the Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and Senior Fellow of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, paints a bleak picture of the decline of the general Russian standard of living.

Physical and mental health, education levels, professional skills, and living and working standards have all deteriorated since the end of the Soviet welfare state. Life expectancy, which had taken a plunge in the early 1990s, remains notoriously low (67.66 years compared to Poland’s 73), especially for males… Between 500,000 and 700,000 people die of alcoholism or alcohol-related causes every year, and 35,000 die in road collisions. Twenty percent of youngsters use drugs, if occasionally. The number of street children, not all of whom are orphans, is over 700,000.[80]  

Russians are acutely aware that despite the luxurious lives of the upper strata of society, the standard of living of ordinary people has declined substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  

A noticeable result of an unhealthy and rapidly declining population, and a rapid influx of immigrants – both legal and illegal – is an explosion of violence directed at immigrants.[81] Amnesty International is just one of many NGOs that have expressed alarm at the rise of race-based attacks across Russia. Furthermore, there is tacit government support for xenophobic slogans and youth movements. In 2007, a law backed by Putin banned foreign workers from being employed in Russian retail markets.[82] Tacit government-backed xenophobic slogans and youth movements have seen nationalist and incendiary slogans, such as ‘Russia for Russians’, increasingly supported by Russian society.[83] According to Aleksandr Verkhovsky, the Director of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, “approximately 50 percent of Russian citizens hold prejudiced views towards foreigners and [various] ethnic groups.”[84] 

The Kremlin is taking a dangerous gamble as it refuses to reign-in mounting nationalism. It hopes to ride the rising wave of national patriotism (and ensure that public opinion remains firmly behind its self-assured foreign policy), while ignoring the destabilising elements of Russia’s ultranationalist movements. Furthermore, the Russian government’s support for mildly nationalist youth movements, such as Nashi, or the more extremist Mestnye – which ran a campaign urging Russians to shun taxis driven by non-Russians – is cause for concern, especially as a “2007 estimate is that 500,000 young Russians belong to extremist youth groups.”[85] The Kremlin risks losing control the virulent wave of extreme nationalism that it seems to currently overlook.  

Putin has repeatedly played to his apprehensive and frustrated domestic public. Many of Putin’s speeches invoke nostalgia for past Soviet glory and an insistence that “Russia was, is and will [always] be a major European power.”[86] In addition to rising intolerance, the Russian public projects a general distaste for what is perceived as American condescension and hypocrisy. Since the Iraq War, the “overwhelmingly negative public image of the United States and its Western allies – carefully sustained by the Russian government – sharply limits the United States' advice on Russia's domestic [and international] affairs.”[87] 

It is likely that Russia’s assertive foreign policy is a result of a combination of foreign and domestic pressure. As the country teeters towards socio-cultural isolationism, a population that feels under siege and a cynical administration will perpetuate an uncompromising foreign policy. The Kremlin will have no reason to change its neo-realist outlook that dismisses cooperative efforts based on shared values and looks to maximise its power vis-à-vis other states.  

PART III

Is a ‘New Cold War’ Looming?

Despite the pressure on its society and the rising tension between the Kremlin and the West, the ‘New Cold War’ that Edward Lucas describes is highly unlikely. There are several reasons for why it is unlikely that such a prolonged standoff will materialise between Moscow and Washington. Firstly, Russia’s military capacity is nowhere close to a capable and battle-hardened as it was during its zenith during the Soviet years. Secondly, and in spite of Russia’s burgeoning economy, the Kremlin realises that its economic growth has a very narrow base, and is particularly vulnerable. Thirdly, Moscow no longer has the wide base of support that the Soviet Union once had.  

Russia’s military has declined substantially despite the fact that its nuclear arsenal has remained an impressive deterrent.  

Today, the operational capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in major, local and regional conflicts is limited by the lack of training on division level and above. In addition, the ability to use weapons platforms is limited due to, for example, the lack of flight hours for pilots.[88]  Not only has the quality of Russian military instruction and infrastructure deteriorated, as suggested by the excerpt above, but an inefficient conscription system has produced systemically low morale throughout the armed forces. Major Gregory Celestan points out that only 50% of those called to serve in the Russian armed forces actually report for duty.[89] Furthermore, he points out that a professional non-commissioned officer corps, which forms the backbone of a modern professional military, is non-existent as promotion to a non-commissioned rank is based on favouritism and longevity of service rather than merit.[90] As a result, the Kremlin possesses an ill-equipped, demoralised, and poorly administered military machine.

In addition to Russia’s military deterioration and its exposed economy, Russia is strategically isolated. Despite the fear in Washington that Russia has moved to improve its relations with China, “Russian strategists recognize that an alliance with China… would be Beijing rather than Moscow-led.”[91] Gone are the days when the Soviet Union could count on the loyalty of client-states, such as Cuba, and the capability of its Warsaw-Pact allies. Moscow’s nominal allies – Armenia, Tajikistan, and Belarus – are respectively too “self-centered”, un-loyal, or independent.[92] Ironically, Dmitri Trenin points out that “Russia’s only true allies, just as 120 years ago, are its own Army and Navy.”[93] As a result, the Kremlin is furiously trying to bolster its military and economic power and boost its international partnerships.

Strategy in the Face of an Awakening Bear 

How can the West, specifically the United States, work towards improving relations with the Kremlin? For starters, the United States needs to re-evaluate the policies that dictate its relationship with Russia. American policymakers need to set aside the dated and romantic idea that the US emerged morally victorious after the end of the Cold War and can, therefore, dictate moral behaviour to other states. The American moral example has been severely dented by President G. W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, moral lectures to the Kremlin, or any other major power, automatically undermine American strategy.[94] Without recognising the ineffectual and largely insincere – since American-backed free-market policies instituted by Yeltsin’s government resulted in “the triumph of criminality” and a growing economic divide between the rich and the impoverished – “US policy toward Russia during the Yeltsin period,” American overtures will continue to be suspect.[95] 

Secondly, the United States must recognise that Russian foreign policymaking is based on a dangerous mix of neo-realist cynicism and a national inferiority complex. There is no place for idealism or self-delusion when dealing with the Kremlin. It must be accepted that Russia is not, nor is ever likely to become, a liberal democracy. Russia has never in its history experienced a stable period of democracy and there is no reason that it will suddenly adopt truly free and fair elections, reign in its national monopolies, and discard its powerful state-security enforcement mechanisms. Dimitri K. Simes urges that the Kremlin be approached with “realism and determination.”[96] When dealing with the Kremlin, the West must be pragmatic and prepare for the worst.  

Vladimir Socor, a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a centrist think tank with a focus on the FSU, points-out that when dealing with the Kremlin the West needs to be united and firm. Part of standing united and firm will mean that Washington will need to bridge the rift with mainland Europe and, while doing so, work to strengthen the EU’s cohesion. Furthermore, Socor has insisted that NATO and its major backers act decisively when considering Georgia’s MAP, and future NATO expansion. He explains that “NATO’s recent failure to approve [Georgia’s admittance to the organisation] at the April 2008 summit emboldened Russia to escalate operations against [Tbilisi].”[97] Vacillation and discord demonstrate weakness, and weakness is an invitation for aggression.  

Thirdly, the West needs to wean itself from its oil and gas dependency. Although President George W. Bush acknowledged that the US needs to break its oil addiction by revolutionising the energy industry[98], there has been little action in moving away from oil dependence. In addition to implementing a coherent policy, the US must help Europe develop one, as well. A short-term solution aimed at lessening Russia’s leverage over Europe may be to further tap North American reserves and offer Europe other energy sources. At the same time, the US should include Europe in its search to find viable alternatives to oil – including developing hydrogen-powered transportation, clean coal-powered generating plants, upgrading to safe nuclear technologies, and turning to man-made geo-thermal power production.

Fourthly, the West must stand-up to Russia, while rejecting the notion that it is involved in a ‘new’ Cold War. The belief that the West is seeking another showdown with Russia only serves to bolster the credibility of a few hardliners that are a throwback to “a delusionary Soviet mentality.”[99] Like an adult dealing with a petulant child, the West must not tolerate Russian bullying and invasions of its allies in the Baltic region (Estonia) or Caucasus (Georgia). Washington should not, however, over-react to Russian provocation or snares. Most importantly, Washington policymakers must make sure that their European allies also don’t react independently to Russian provocation.

The West should engage with the Kremlin and acknowledge its influence along its periphery, and should encourage it to act responsibly.[100] However, respect must not give way to apathy, especially when the Kremlin intimidates and forces its small neighbours into submission.  

Lastly, despite growing cooperation between Russia and China through the SCO and other agreements, the West should not seek to undermine the burgeoning organisation. Instead, the SCO should be seen as a useful actor that will serve to temper Russian policies. While the Kremlin seeks to solidify its security arrangements with Beijing, the US should work to strengthen its economic and diplomatic ties with China. Beijing has long come in from the cold and does not seek to upset the close economic and diplomatic relationship that it has developed with Washington. Furthermore, Beijing is wary of Russian attempts to exploit the separatist quality of Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia, and Southern Ossetia. China is uneasy over the recent Tibetan uprising and ongoing Uighur unrest in Xinjiang province. Beijing has expressed alarm at Russia’s recent betrayal[101] of a fundamental SCO aim – that of working against separatism and secessionism – in its dealings with the break-away republics of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia. For the time being, the SCO is no more than an impressive “…debating club rather than a genuine alliance.”[102] 

The West should further keep in mind that, despite the impressive statistics that the SCO boasts, there exist competing interests amongst its central members. Russia and China look to the SCO for very different reasons. China wants access to the energy-rich Central Asian steppe, whereas Russia wants the SCO to emerge as a counterweight to an expanding NATO.[103] The West needs to work to keep the SCO as it is – a negotiating forum designed to reduce tensions between Beijing and Moscow.

Strategy aside, the West must realise that Russia is looking to recover from the humiliation it suffered during the 1990s and to protect its strategic interests. In light of its desire to secure a prominent position among great powers, the West must not provoke the Kremlin if it is unwilling to then resolutely stand-up to it. Furthermore, the West must keep in mind that the Kremlin’s policies are being fuelled by domestic pressures, as well as international ones. It is certain that there are worrisome trends emerging within Russian society, its government, and its foreign policy; however, identifying the Kremlin as an imminent strategic threat is counter-productive and will simply embolden the hardliners within the Kremlin – making future dialogue with Russia more difficult.  

_____

FOOTNOTES
[1] Frank James, “The Russians Have a Parade,” The Swamp – The Chicago Tribune’s Washington Bureau, May 9th, 2008, http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/foreign_policy/ [viewed 19/08/08].
[2] Although Russian forces had been involved in the 1991-1992 Georgian conflict, during the early 1990s Georgia was not a close Western ally. Since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2004, Georgia has increasingly looked towards the West. Georgia joined the Coalition of the Willing and sent troops to aid the American-led coalition efforts to rebuild Iraq. Although Georgia was not offered a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April, 2008, it had previously signed a Partnership for Peace Agreement (PFP) with NATO in 2005 – tentatively the first step toward NATO inclusion. Taken from; __, “NATO Denies Georgia and Ukraine,” BBC News, April 03, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7328276.stm [viewed: 18/08/08].
[3] Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West (London, New York, Berlin: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008), 10.
[4] The spate of bombings commenced on the 31st of August, 1999 with an explosion in a Moscow underground market and included a car bombing in Dagestan on the 4th of September, a bombing in an nine-storey building in Moscow on the 8th of September, a second bombing in an eight-storey Moscow building on the 13th of September, and a truck-bomb in southern Russia on the 16th of September. Over the course of 17 days, 277 people were killed in terrorist attacks attributed, by the Kremlin, to separatist Chechen fighters. Taken from: Lucas, The New Cold War, 30.
[5] Ibid., 30.
[6] Speech given by Former President Vladimir Putin (translated into English), April 25, 2005, The Kremlin, Moscow, The President of Russia – English website, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml [viewed 17/08/08].
[7] Speech given by Former President Vladimir Putin (translated into English), September 4th, 2004, The Kremlin, Moscow, The President of Russia – English website, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/09/04/1958_type82912_76332.shtml [viewed 17/08/08].
[8] Christopher LaMonica, International Politics: The Classic Texts, 2nd edition (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2004), 54. Taken from: Joseph Gavorse, ed., The Complete Writings of Thucydides - the Peloponnesian War (New York: Modern Library, 1934).
[9] Speech by Putin (translated into English), September 4th, 2004, The President of Russia – English website.
[10] Janusz Bugajski, “US Policy Toward Russia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Enterprise Institute Conference, 13 July, 2006, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4752/type,1/ [viewed 16/08/08].
[11] Speech by Putin (translated into English), April 25, 2005, The President of Russia – English website.
[12] Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2001): 8.
[13] Ibid., 12-16.
[14] Ibid., 12.
[15] Ibid., 15-16.
[16] Katja Mirwaldt and Vladimir I Ivanov, “Russia: Struggling for dignity,” in Global Security Governance: competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, ed. Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling (New York: Routledge, 2007), 243.
[17] Ibid., 256.
[18] Hannes Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs: Images and Reality,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 71, No. 1 (Jan., 1995): 35.
[19] Henry E. Hale and Rein Taagepra, “Russia: Consolidation or Collapse?” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 7 (Nov., 2002): 1120.
[20] Dimitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 49.
[21] Ibid. 
[22] George W. Breslauer, “Personalism Versus Proceduralism,” in Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), 39.
[23] Veljko Vujacic, “Serving Mother Russia,” in Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), 291.
[24] Celeste A. Wallander, “The Russian National Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis,” PONARS Policy Memo, July 1998, Harvard University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0030.pdf [viewed 17/08/08], 2.
[25] Igor Zevelev, “The Redefinition of the Russian Nation, International Security, and Stability,” in Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), 266.
[26] Wallander, “The Russian Security Concept: A Liberal-Statist Synthesis,” 4.
[27] Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign Policy and the West,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000): 567.
[28] Ibid., 547.
[29] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 41-42.
[30] Ibid., 44.
[31] Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter, 1997-1998): 15.
[32] Between 1992 and 1993, Russian forces aided a pro-Kremlin government in Dushanbe during the Tajik Civil War. 
[33] Eduard Shevardnadze seized power by way of a coup d’état that overthrew President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1991. Russia originally armed Abkhaz separatists in their struggle against Tbilisi’s government and then turned a blind eye when Shevardnadze seized power. Only when Gamsakhurdia emerged from exile in Chechnya and organised an advance on Tbilisi, did Tbilisi request a Russian ‘intervention’. Taken from: Darrell L Slider, “Georgia,” in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies (Federal Research Division) ed. Glenn E. Curtis (?: DIANE Publishing, 1996), 209.
[34] Adomeit, “Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality,” 46-47.
[35] Ibid., 46.
[36] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 46.
[37] Generally, Russian oligarchs made millions (if not billions) during the early years of the Yeltsin administration when the official policy was to encourage privatisation. Entrepreneurs, and sometimes simply well-dressed gangsters, with questionable funding managed to purchase previously-nationalised industrial sectors such as oil refineries, oil wells, mines, smelting operations, radio and television networks, and gas fields. People such as Vladimir Gusinsky (at one stage, Russia’s wealthiest media tycoon), Boris Berezovsky (an oil magnate and media mogul who initially supported Boris Yeltsin’s political career), Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the founder of the now-defunct Yukos oil company) made fortunes but were unwise enough to openly challenge Putin’s new administration. The Kremlin arrested, investigated, and systematically targeted oligarchs that refused to acquiesce to the new administration. Khodorkovsky ended up in a Siberian prison camp, Berezovsky lives in exile in London, and Gusinsky fled to Israel. Only loyal and subservient oligarchs have remained largely unscathed by FSB investigations and tax audits. Taken from: Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 62-67.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., 73.
[40] Ibid., 30.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 77.
[43] __, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003: Russia,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25th, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27861.htm [viewed 18/08/08].
[44] Henry E. Hale, “Russia: Consolidation or Collapse?,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 7 (Nov., 2002): 1101.
[45] David McDonald, “Domestic Conjunctures, the Russian State, and the World Outside, 1700-2006,” in Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past, ed. Robert Levgold (New York: Columbia Press, 2007), 145.
[46] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 89.
[47] __, “Putin Q&A: International Agenda,” Russia Today, February 15, 2008, http://russiatoday.ru/news/news/20978 [viewed 22/03/08].
[48] Mirwaldt and Ivanov, “Russia: Struggling for dignity,” in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, 239.
[49] Emil J. Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, ed. Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling (New York: Routledge, 2007), 18.
[50] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 70.
[51] Gregory Dubinsky, “Georgia: Kiss NATO Goodbye?,” Transitions Online, August 13, 2008, http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=282&NrSection=4&NrArticle=19841 [viewed: 16/08/08].
[52] __, “Venezuela: Oil,” Energy Information Administration – US Department of Energy, October, 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html [viewed 21/08/08].
[53] __, “Economy: Russia,” CIA World Fact Book, August 7, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html [viewed 20/08/08].
[54] Alvin Rabushka and Michael S. Bernstam, “The Russian Economy: Russia on Auto-Pilot,” Leland Stanford Junior University, Hoover Institute – Stanford University, June 6, 2003, http://www.hoover.org/research/russianecon/essays/5143302.html [viewed 20/08/08].
[55] __, “Caspian Sea: Oil Exploration Issues,” Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration – US Department of Energy, Jan, 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/Full.html [viewed 20/08/08].
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Barry Wood, “Georgia Fighting Raises Concerns Over Oil Pipeline, Prices,” News Voice of America Online, August 11, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-08-11-voa65.cfm [viewed 20/08/08].
[59] Mark Bentley and Eduard Gismatullin, “BP Says Unclear When BTC Pipeline Will Be Repaired (Update1),” August 15th, 2008, Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601207&sid=ajR3bwpgIgkc&refer=energy# [viewed 20/08/08].
[60] __, “Caspian Sea: Oil Exploration Issues,” Energy Information Administration – US Department of Energy, Jan, 2007.
[61] Speech given by President Dmitri Medvedev (translated into English), August 13, 2008, The Kremlin, Moscow, The President of Russia – English website, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/13/1829_type82913_205272.shtml [viewed 20/08/08].
[62] Stephen J. Blank, “US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them,” The Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College (March, 2007): 2. Taken from: Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L. P. Swanstrom, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. LIII, No. 4 (July-August, 2006): 24-25.
[63] Blank, “US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them,” The Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College, 12.
[64] Sergei Blagov, “Russia Views NATO Expansion as a Strategic Threat,” Power and Interest News Report (PINR), May 5, 2004, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=166&language_id=1 [viewed 20/08/08].
[65] Vladimir Socor, “The Goals Behind Moscow’s Proxy Offensive in Southern Ossetia,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, published by The Jamestown Foundation, August 8, 2008, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373298 [viewed 21/08/08].
[66] Ibid.
[67] Radio report by Anne Garrels, “Russia Feels Slighted As West Fears Its Resurgence,” National Public Radio – Morning Edition, August 19, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93728822&ft=1&f=1001 [listened to 20/08/08].
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] David Charter, “Russia Threatens Military Response to US Missile Defence Deal,” The Times online, July 9, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4295309.ece [viewed 20/08/08]. 
[71] Stephen J. Blank, “Towards a New Russia Policy,” The Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College (February, 2008): 10.  
[72] __, “Russia Restores Bomber Patrols,” CNN World, August 17, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/17/russia.airforce.reut/index.html [viewed 21/08/08].
[73] __, “Russia May Answer Western Pressure with Bases in Cuba,” RIA Novosti – Russian News and Information Agency, August 4, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080804/115667177.html [viewed 21/08/08].
[74] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 70.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Blagov, “Russia Views NATO Expansion as a Strategic Threat”.
[77] Yu Bin, “Crouching Alliance, Hidden Angst?” YaleGlobal Online, October 10, 2007, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=9793 [viewed 21/05/08].
[78] Dmitri V. Trenin, Getting Russia Right (Washington D.C., Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 26.
[79] Trenin, Getting Russia Right, 26.
[80] Ibid., 26-27.
[81] Ibid., 27.
[82] __, “Russia,” State of the World’s Human Rights, Amnesty International Report 2008, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/europe-and-central-asia/russian-federation [viewed 21/08/08].  
[83] Trenin, Getting Russia Right, 27.
[84] __, “The Putin Government's Responses to Increased Xenophobia,” Event Summary, January 07, 2008, 12:00 – 1:00 pm. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars website, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=342823&fuseaction=events.event_summary [viewed 22/08/08].
[85] Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, 103-104. Taken from: Anna Fedakina, “Young and Very Dangerous (Юный и очень опасный),” the Daily All-Russia Newspaper (Ежедневная Оъщероссийская Газета), July 17, 2007, http://www.newizv.ru/news/2007-07-17/72924/ [viewed 21/08/08].
[86] Speech given by Former President Vladimir Putin (translated into English), April 25, 2005, The Kremlin, Moscow, The President of Russia – English website, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml [viewed 17/08/08].
[87] Dimitri K. Simes, “Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86603/dimitri-k-simes/losing-russia.html?mode=print [viewed 17/06/08]. 
[88] Jan Leijonhielm, Jan T. Knoph, Robert L. Larsson, Ingmar Oldberg, Wilhelm Unge, and Carolina Vendil Pallin, “Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective: Problems and Trends in 2005,” Summary and conclusions from a study for the Swedish Ministry of Defence, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), June 2005, http://www.foi.se/upload/rapporter/foi-russian-military-capability.pdf [viewed 29/08/08], 13.
[89] Major Gregory J Celestan, “Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya,” Foreign Military Studies Office – US Army (August, 1996), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/wounded.htm [viewed 29/08/08].
[90] Major Celestan, “Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya.”
[91] Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,” in Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: US and Russian Perspectives, The Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College (November, 2007): 37. 
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Simes, “Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” 2007.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Socor, “The Goals Behind Moscow’s Proxy Offensive in Southern Ossetia,” Eurasian Daily Monitor, August 8, 2008.
[98] President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address by the President,” January 31, 2006, The White House – President George W. Bush website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/ [viewed 21/08/08].
[99] David Satter, “Testimony before Congress,” Testimony of David Satter, House Committee on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2007, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/sat051707.htm [viewed 11/07/08].
[100] Martha Brill Olcott, “Truth and Perception,” Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (August, 2008): 3.
[101] Farangis Najibullah, “SCO Fails to Back Russia over Georgia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 August 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/08/mil-080828-rferl03.htm [viewed 29/08/08].
[102] Simes, “Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007.
[103] Mark Leonard, What Does China Really Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 101.