Historical Background
The historical focus of this study spans the time period between the outbreak of violence during the 1999 referendum and the attempted 2008 assassinations of President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. In order to fully understand East Timor’s current instability, it is important to discuss its long colonial past. Like many former colonies, the country’s history has been traumatic. East Timor’s colonial status lasted much longer than other Lusophone states and, as a result, the country has faced unique challenges that continue to impact on effective governance, economic stability, and political processes.
A Portuguese Colony
Portugal maintained a colonial presence in Eastern Timor for approximately 400 years after its discovery by Portuguese sailors between 1512 and 1513.[1] Until 1769, when the city of Dili was founded[2] as a secure administrative centre against surprise attacks by the Topass[3] – the name given by the Dutch to “the off-spring of Portuguese soldiers, sailors, and traders … who intermarried with local women.”[4] By the mid-1800’s Eastern Timor became a destination for sandalwood traders and Dominican missionaries.[5] Many missionaries were disappointed aspirants who had hoped to proselytise in the Portuguese colonies along India’s western coast.[6]
In the middle of the 17th Century, the Portuguese invaded the eastern part of Timor in an attempt to extend their influence over the interior kingdoms and to counter the growing Dutch influence on the western side of the island.[7] In the 17th and 18th Centuries, Topass groups were armed and supported by the relatively weak Portuguese colonists who used them to expel the Dutch and counter their retaliatory raids from the western side of the island.[8]
With Portuguese support, the Topass managed to defeat the Dutch near Kupang in 1656, yet this alliance was not able to repel a Dutch counter-offensive launched in 1749.9 Following their swift victory, the Dutch negotiated a settlement with the Portuguese that resulted in the partition of the island. The Portuguese capitalised on the weakened state of the Topass and gradually reduced the challenge they had begun to pose to Portuguese interests.[10]
Although Portuguese Timor gained more importance to Portugal’s colonial administration following Dili’s establishment, the colony remained largely underdeveloped and poorly governed. Throughout the early 19th Century, Portuguese influence was slow to reach rural areas and was periodically challenged by local rebellions and rebellious kingdoms.
The administration of Portuguese Timor was heavily influenced by Portugal’s colonies in Mozambique and India between the founding of Dili and the early 1900’s.[11] This was largely caused by the staffing of the Portuguese colonial army, which drew a significant number of soldiers from its colony in Lourenço Marques[12] (present-day Mozambique).
During the years 1911 – 1914 a series of rebellions swept across Eastern Timor and forced the colonial administration to call for reinforcements from Portuguese Africa.[13] With the arrival of the troops, and aided by a series of alliances with local kingdoms, the Portuguese defeated the rebellion and extended the Crown’s rule across the eastern part of the island.[14]
Though the Portuguese colonial period has been described by Michael Smith and Moreen Dee as “benign”, Sukanya Mohan Das[15] draws attention not only to Portugal’s systematic infrastructural neglect[16], but also to the repressive tactics employed by Portuguese administrators.[17] The mobilisation of Portuguese colonial military reserves from Lisbon’s African colonies in order to quell the rebellions in the early 1900’s “resulted in the deaths of 3,000 East Timorese, while historical records refer to the widespread destruction wrought by Captain Mayor Francisco Fernandes [in order] to subdue the Kingdom of Wehale.”[18] The brutal tactics employed by the African soldiers, coupled with resettlement from Lourenço Marques and Angola, resulted in Timorese resentment of colonial immigrants from Africa.[19]
Japanese Occupation and the Return to Portuguese Rule
In order to secure vital supplies of natural resources for its campaigns in Manchuria and against the United States, Japan thrust into the Asia-Pacific region on 1942.[20] Timor quickly became a prime target as it provided a frontline defence against an Australian counter-attack on the valuable oil fields the Japanese seized in Indonesia and the rubber plantations of French Indo-China. On 20th February 1942, Japanese forces launched a full-scale invasion of the island and caught the Dutch, Portuguese, and Australian forces off-guard.[21] The Australians and their Dutch allies had not expected Japan to push southwards across the Dutch East Indies as quickly as it did. Nor did they anticipate that the Japanese would invade the eastern half of Timor in violation of Portugal’s neutrality.[22]
Though the Dutch and Australian defenders fought valiantly, they “were forced to surrender on 23rd February.”[23] In addition to the main Japanese offensive against the Dutch stronghold of Kupang, they launched an invasion of Dili.[24] Australian forces had planned to concentrate their defence on the Dutch side of the island and dispatched 250 soldiers to Portuguese Timor to gain support from the indigenous and Topass inhabitants.[25] The local Timorese proved vital for the Australian-directed guerrilla campaign against the Japanese forces.
[An] Australian survivor of the year long guerrilla campaign commented that without the help of the creados, Timorese who assisted the Australians, the guerrilla campaign could not have been conducted the way it was. Another said, "they were so good, the creados, they risked their lives all the time for us, it shamed you really." …Some took up arms themselves and fought alongside the Australians.[26]
While vital to the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese invaders, the East Timorese (in particular) paid a high price – between 40,000 and 60,000[27] were killed and many villages were punished for aiding the Allied forces.[28] Japanese tactics included the destruction of food stores and crops[29], the use of forced labour (called romusha), and the enslavement of women as jugun ianfu (comfort women).[30] In 2002, Maurubi, an 80 year-old survivor of the Japanese invasion recounted the horrors experienced by the East Timorese:
“As slave [labourers], men, women and children were forced to build the main road from Hau through Oli, Kai, Ualele, Uato-Lari, Nunumalau, Haunau, Aedere, Lhare to Baguia. They had no clothes or food. Many people died. When we did receive food, the Japanese military would take it from us and make us watch them eat our food. The Japanese military was very cruel.”[31]
Though their retaliatory tactics and human rights abuses exacted a tremendous toll on the East Timorese, the Japanese left behind a network of roads, communication infrastructure, and an airport.[32] Ironically, the ‘benign’ Portuguese failed to develop East Timor for centuries before the Second World War, and its development was, instead, increased during the short and cruel Japanese occupation.
With the end of the Second World War, East Timor reverted back to Portuguese control[33]. Although infrastructural development projects had been started by the Japanese during their 3 year occupation, once the island returned to Portuguese administration, the colonial bureaucrats again neglected development. This legacy of underdevelopment and illiteracy would have ramifications during the rest of the 21st century. Foreign capital (and nominal development) began to trickle in during “… the late 1950’s… [in the form of] economic, administrative, social and cultural investments.”[34] Despite attempts to expand the colony’s cultivation of cinnamon, cacao, coffee, and rubber production, “the economy remained largely a subsistence agricultural [one].”[35]
A second effect of East Timorese underdevelopment was the state of the colony’s educational infrastructure. It was not until the early 1960’s that the Portuguese began to invest in the sector. Prior to the 1960’s most primary education was provided by the Catholic Church.[36] However, with Portuguese investment, “[the] number of primary school students [rose to] almost… 60,000 in 1972.”[37]
In 1974, Portuguese policy towards its overseas territories shifted dramatically as a general feeling of malaise and a rejection of colonial commitments swept through Lisbon and resulted in the ‘Carnation Revolution’ and subsequent military coup.[38] Following the military revolt in Lisbon, the Portuguese armed forces extricated themselves from their costly colonial commitments. A disagreement paralysed the independence process in many overseas territories due to a rift between officers who favoured an immediate withdrawal and transfer of power to the existing freedom movements and those who favoured a lengthier transfer that would guarantee elections.[39] Portugal’s mishandling of East Timorese independence allowed Indonesia to execute a rapid annexation of the territory.
1975 Indonesian Invasion
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor took place on 7th December 1975.[40] Jakarta had been working to destabilise divisions between East Timor’s political parties to undermine the shaky coalition between the Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) and the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste (FRETILIN).[41] In the year and a half before the Indonesian invasion, Portugal relaxed its control of the territory’s political space. Initially three political parties emerged: the UDT, the Associação Social-Democrata Timorense (ASDT) – a political party with socialist inclinations – and the Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense (APODETI) – a pro-Indonesian reunification party heavily funded by Jakarta.[42] The ASDT and the UDT formed a coalition from which FRETILIN emerged.[43]
It quickly became apparent to Jakarta that APODETI lacked popular support, and the only way to undermine FRETILIN would be to force a wedge between the UDT and FRETILIN’s left-wing. The government of Indonesia (GOI) ran a surreptitious campaign against FRETILIN, warning that its Marxist ideology would result in an ‘Asian Cuba’.[44] In late 1974, the United States and its Asian-Pacific and Austral-Asian allies were engaged in a conflict against Communist forces in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s strategy resulted in US tacit approval for the future invasion of East Timor.
During the lead-up to the invasion, the UDT “…withdrew from the [FRETILIN] coalition out of fear of the Communist elements of the ASDT, [and] demand[ed] that all communists be removed from the island.”[45] The UDT followed its demand with a coup, staged on 11th August 1975.[46] FRETILIN forces launched a counter-coup and, by 25th August, drove UDT and APODETI forces into West Timor.[47]
Portuguese colonial forces withdrew from the island, leaving FRETILIN as the defacto government in Dili. FRETILIN moved quickly to bolster its security services to counter a destabilisation campaign organised by the Indonesian military, which was positioned along the West Timorese border. Approximately 1,500[48] Timorese lost their lives in the fighting between FRETILIN and UDT/APODETI forces.[49] Infiltrators from West Timor continued to attack villages, burn crops, and generally terrorise East Timorese communities along the border.[50]
Alarmed at the deteriorating situation, FRETILIN moved to assure the Indonesians of Dili’s commitment to democracy and good relations. Additionally, FRETILIN “…requested [that] Portuguese authorities return from exile… [in order to] continue the decolonisation process.”[51] Its strategy failed to improve the security situation: the GOI ignored its overtures and Lisbon, its requests.[52] FRETILIN declared independence on 28th November 1975; and the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) invaded with overwhelming force in early December 1975.[53]
The ferocity of the ABRI’s tactics devastated the East Timorese population. Though Indonesian human rights (HR) abuses reached their climax in the first five years following the invasion, execution, torture, imprisonment without trial, and other forms of intimidation occurred throughout the entire Indonesian occupation. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 East Timorese were killed by Indonesian forces during the four months following the Indonesian invasion.[54] And a Portuguese source states that up to “44% of the pre-occupation population was killed between the invasion and 1981.”[55]
In addition to systematic killings, the Indonesians attempted to “weaken kinship ties and social cohesion within the East Timorese population.”[56] The ABRI and its paramilitary proxies forcibly relocated entire villages to sever their linkage to their land, which undermined the traditional Timorese class system based on land ownership. Other ABRI tactics were to force potential FRETILIN sympathisers to search for FRETILIN and Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL)[57] guerrillas in order to assassinate them, and the enforcement of the use of Bahasa Indonesian in the public and educational sectors.[58]
In the early 1980’s, the GOI shifted tactics and tried to win hearts and minds by implementing similar strategies as those used by the Portuguese in the 1960’s. Jakarta “developed plans… [that] prioritised agricultural and rural development, education and health, transportation, communications and public sector development.”[59] The GOI invested heavily in these sectors and, consequently, elevated East Timor beyond the level of development reached during the Portuguese colonial period.
Despite this new strategy, in the 1975 invasion much of the “existing school system [suffered extensive damage], and in 1976 there were less than 14,000 pupils in 47 elementary schools and 2 junior high schools serving a population of more than 600,000.”[60] Although the Indonesians began to inject much needed funding into education, there was little infrastructure left undamaged and most projects had to be started anew.
With the Indonesian invasion and decades of brutality, attempts to smother East Timorese identity and a strategy aimed at overwhelming East Timor’s bifurcated governance structures[61], the Catholic Church and the besieged armed resistance forces (predominantly FALINTIL) represented the only remaining functioning local political and social institutions. In fact, “…when Indonesia invaded the territory of Portuguese Timor in December 1975, the Church was practically the only organised institution.”[62]
Not only did the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church “identify with the independence struggle…”[63], but the wider East Timorese population turned to Catholicism as a way to resist Panca Sila – or the ‘Five Principles’[64] that underpinned the philosophy of Sukarno’s Indonesia. Notably, “…the number of registered Catholics in East Timor prior to the Indonesian invasion was no more than 30 percent but by the 1990’s this figure had increased to 80 percent of the population.”[65]
The Peacemaking and Stabilisation Process
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor came under increasing foreign scrutiny during the 1990’s. On 12th November 1991, ABRI forces opened fire on a procession of mourners paying their respects to the memory of two East Timorese youths they killed the month before.[66] This event became known as the Santa Cruz Massacre. The massacre was brought to the world’s attention when it was recorded on video by a British journalist.[67] The scenes of soldiers firing on unarmed mourners and pro-Timorese independence protestors caused a sharp anti-Indonesian backlash in Australia and other Western countries[68], and focused attention on Indonesia’s repressive tactics in East Timor.
In early 1999, President Bachuaruddin Jusuf Habibie – who succeeded President Suharto – announced that Indonesia would allow East Timorese to determine their political status through a referendum.[69] The order came from Jakarta, and the ABRI was not consulted. Seeing its economic interests in East Timor and its political power challenged in Jakarta, the ABRI “established, trained and directed local militia groups in a campaign of intimidation with the objective of averting the referendum.”[70]
Despite reports of violence and HR abuses, Lisbon agreed to Jakarta’s referendum, with three caveats: a) the UN would oversee any political transformation; b) the GOI and ABRI would be responsible for maintaining order and a “safe environment” during the referendum; and, c) the referendum would be held in August 1999.[71] Following consultations with the UN Security Council, the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to coordinate and implement the referendum.
In the months leading up to the referendum, ABRI-supported militias tried to disrupt UN preparations for the referendum. Militias forced between 40,000 and 85,000 people from their homes and attacked UN offices in Dili.[72] Despite intimidation, East Timorese turned out in force on voting day. When UNAMET declared that “an overwhelming majority had voted for independence,” the ABRI unleashed its militia forces and troops.[73] The ensuing carnage and violence caught both East Timorese and UNAMET observers by surprise.
Out of a total population of 890,000, UNICEF estimated in late September that 141,000 people had been deported to West Timor and between 190,000 and 300,000 were hiding in East Timor… Hunger and disease were widespread among the displaced, most of whom were cut off from food and water supplies by insecurity, rough terrain, broken-down transport…[74]
UNAMET found itself severely constrained by its mandate and limited manpower, and was forced to withdraw from the island on 14th September after its offices and personnel were attacked by militia groups.
Ostensibly, international pressure forced President Habibie to permit a military intervention to restore order in East Timor. However, upon closer examination, several issues converged and ultimately contributed to Habibie’s decision:
a) Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank threatened to withhold future loans and to suspend the ongoing renegotiation of existing debt unless Jakarta allowed an intervention to restore order to East Timor.[75]
b) The United States was adamant that the ABRI be reigned-in in East Timor to prevent the continuing unrest to be used as an excuse to launch a coup d’etat in Jakarta.[76]
c) The United States supported Australia’s (and several other interested countries’) concern that “East Timor represented a major test of UN credibility” and that following the fiascos in Somalia and Rwanda, the international community could not afford to let the UN’s reputation be sullied once again.[77]
Although INTERFET was not strictly a UN mission, it was authorized by the UN Security Council. Resolution 1264 called for the “[restoration of] peace and security in East Timor, [and the protection and support of] UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, [the facilitation of] humanitarian assistance operations.”[78] The intervention was led by Australia, but supported by New Zealand and 20 other countries (including the United States).[79] The well-armed INTERFET forces quickly restored order and created a space in which reconstruction projects and state-building operations could commence. A conservative estimate supplied by the UN Report of the International Commission of Inquiry in East Timor to the Secretary-General suggested that the INTERFET mission saved 5,000 - 10,000 lives.[80]
Canberra made it clear that once it had restored peace and security, it would progressively (but expeditiously) transfer peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) mission. The hand-over occurred in February 2000, four months after the Indonesian parliament approved East Timor’s independence.[81] Although INTERFET was successful in restoring order and UNTAET was able to administer the nascent country while it worked to establish and support East Timor’s government, the country still faced insecurity and local grievances that have led to subsequent crises.
UNTAET’s mandate ended in May 2002, at which point its peacekeeping responsibilities were incorporated into the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). UNMISET was tasked with providing assistance to the government of East Timor (or, by 2002, Timor-Leste) until it became self-sufficient.[82]
UMISET withdrew in May of 2005 and turned the responsibility for the maintenance of order and security over to the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL).[83] The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was charged with supporting the democratic and administrative strengthening of the East Timorese government. Although UNOTIL’s mandate called for it to disband in May 2006, growing tensions and escalating violence caused the mission’s mandate to be extended until August 2006.
In 2006, mounting discontent within the ranks of the F-FDTL and its veterans caused a rift between different political factions and exposed a political schism in which a large number of disgruntled East Timorese soldiers from the western side of the territory protest against discrimination within the F-FDTL and its eastern East Timorese officer corps. Further complications arose when the disgruntled forces claimed that the new East Timor police force included a large number of personnel who “…had worked for the Indonesian administration.”[84] As the crisis worsened, political fault lines appeared between then President Xanana Gusmão and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.
As conditions worsened, the government of East Timor requested assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia. The Australian-led ISF responded to Dili’s request for help restoring order and deployed following the unrest of April and May 2006.[85] Also following the 2006 crisis, the UN Security Council voted to establish the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) aimed at supporting the Timor Leste government, democracy building, the improvement of the country’s police force, and assist in post-conflict peacebuilding and capacity-building.[86]
Although the UNMIT mission and ISF deployment are independent missions, they coordinate their efforts so that UNMIT can focus on capacity-building in a stable environment. The ISF is primarily concerned with maintaining security to allow UNMIT police operations and training missions to strengthen East Timor’s law enforcement capabilities. The ISF’s presence in Dili proved central to the rapid suppression of tensions during the unsuccessful 11th February 2008 assassination attempts on President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. ISF forces were able to evacuate the injured Ramos-Horta to Darwin for medical treatment.[87]
The Effects of East Timor’s Historical Experience
A new state’s historical inheritance generally becomes evident as social dislocation, unrest, and disintegration occur. While the underlying causes are directly related to many years of poor governance, neglect, repression, and societal stratification, often the analysis provided by foreign specialists focus on superficial shortcomings that fail to properly examine their drivers. If a colonial power left a country in shambles, with half-built, but irreparably sabotaged high-rise buildings, houses stripped of their electrical wiring, and with very few locally trained experts[88] – as occurred in Mozambique – the effect would not only be felt immediately, but would linger for years and possibly decades. The effects of East Timor’s violent history, developmental neglect and internal divisions, vary greatly.
A History of Violence
East Timor’s history of violence and dispossession at the hands of invaders has been a common thread in Timorese history since the first Portuguese and Dutch settlements in the 1500’s. Although many former colonies experienced dispossession during their colonial period and have endured civil conflict, most have managed to bridge division and redress past wrongs. In East Timor, which “…has suffered successive waves [of dispossession and varied forms of violence], from Portuguese colonization through Japanese occupation to Indonesian invasion,”[89] recovery has been particularly slow.
The result of East Timor’s history of violence has been an inculcated sense of helplessness and the development of a quasi self-help society based on kinship ties (if they were not severed during the period of Indonesian rule), community groupings, gang-affiliations, and ethno-linguistic bonds. A significant side-effect of Indonesia’s resettlement campaigns is the growth of landless peasants – a significant problem in a society whose class system and structure is rooted in land inheritance – many of whom moved to Dili and have become urban poor, living in squalid conditions. The urban discontent and overcrowding in Dili has added fuel to an already problematic gang-culture.
Although gangs are not new to East Timor – under Portuguese colonial rule, gangs (called moradores) were co-opted and used as repressive agents, and during the Indonesian occupation gangs and militias were employed as death squads[90] – the pressures of urbanisation, societal disaffection, unemployment, and assimilation have caused many young men to join gangs. In 2006, James Scambery estimated that unemployment in Dili exceeded 50% and made gang membership an attractive option for large numbers of aimless, uprooted, and economically impoverished youth.[91]
East Timor’s gangs are not simply youth gangs. Many are highly organised paramilitary forces – in the sense that they can be mobilised to achieve political goals as a militia – loyal to “…different factions within the security forces and political parties.”[92] In July 2006, members of the Juventude Para Paz e Justiça[93] (JPJ) gang organised a violent protest outside of the detention centre where Alfredo Reinado was held.[94] In addition to demanding the release of the former major of the F-FDTL, the gang called for Malaysian and Australian troops to remain in their barracks so it could launch an attack on the Guardia Nacional Republicana (GNR)[95] – the Portuguese National Republican Guard[96].
Systemic Underdevelopment
Systemic neglect (apart from investment in transportation and communication links - with a high human cost - during the Indonesian occupation) has taken its toll on East Timor. Chronic agricultural underdevelopment has left East Timor in a precarious position and the country was unable to mitigate the effects of the ‘97/’98 drought, which resulted in famine. Its demography was negatively impacted by the drought, as well as insecurity and limited job prospects, all of which have resulted in an out-migration of working age Timorese.[97] Inefficiency in the management of health services and disorder in the provision of healthcare have likewise produced a steady flight of healthcare practitioners.[98] Recent attacks (in which schools suffered collateral damage), institutional inefficiency, the introduction of two new languages (Portuguese and Tetum), and material shortages have all presented formidable challenges to the educational sector.[99]
Although East Timor is fortunate in that it does not exhibit the same unequal resource and capital distribution that afflicts many developing states, poverty is a considerable issue. In East Timor, “poverty is a problem of low [economic and agricultural] production…,” high urban density, and low literacy levels.[100]
A Portuguese Colony
Portugal maintained a colonial presence in Eastern Timor for approximately 400 years after its discovery by Portuguese sailors between 1512 and 1513.[1] Until 1769, when the city of Dili was founded[2] as a secure administrative centre against surprise attacks by the Topass[3] – the name given by the Dutch to “the off-spring of Portuguese soldiers, sailors, and traders … who intermarried with local women.”[4] By the mid-1800’s Eastern Timor became a destination for sandalwood traders and Dominican missionaries.[5] Many missionaries were disappointed aspirants who had hoped to proselytise in the Portuguese colonies along India’s western coast.[6]
In the middle of the 17th Century, the Portuguese invaded the eastern part of Timor in an attempt to extend their influence over the interior kingdoms and to counter the growing Dutch influence on the western side of the island.[7] In the 17th and 18th Centuries, Topass groups were armed and supported by the relatively weak Portuguese colonists who used them to expel the Dutch and counter their retaliatory raids from the western side of the island.[8]
With Portuguese support, the Topass managed to defeat the Dutch near Kupang in 1656, yet this alliance was not able to repel a Dutch counter-offensive launched in 1749.9 Following their swift victory, the Dutch negotiated a settlement with the Portuguese that resulted in the partition of the island. The Portuguese capitalised on the weakened state of the Topass and gradually reduced the challenge they had begun to pose to Portuguese interests.[10]
Although Portuguese Timor gained more importance to Portugal’s colonial administration following Dili’s establishment, the colony remained largely underdeveloped and poorly governed. Throughout the early 19th Century, Portuguese influence was slow to reach rural areas and was periodically challenged by local rebellions and rebellious kingdoms.
The administration of Portuguese Timor was heavily influenced by Portugal’s colonies in Mozambique and India between the founding of Dili and the early 1900’s.[11] This was largely caused by the staffing of the Portuguese colonial army, which drew a significant number of soldiers from its colony in Lourenço Marques[12] (present-day Mozambique).
During the years 1911 – 1914 a series of rebellions swept across Eastern Timor and forced the colonial administration to call for reinforcements from Portuguese Africa.[13] With the arrival of the troops, and aided by a series of alliances with local kingdoms, the Portuguese defeated the rebellion and extended the Crown’s rule across the eastern part of the island.[14]
Though the Portuguese colonial period has been described by Michael Smith and Moreen Dee as “benign”, Sukanya Mohan Das[15] draws attention not only to Portugal’s systematic infrastructural neglect[16], but also to the repressive tactics employed by Portuguese administrators.[17] The mobilisation of Portuguese colonial military reserves from Lisbon’s African colonies in order to quell the rebellions in the early 1900’s “resulted in the deaths of 3,000 East Timorese, while historical records refer to the widespread destruction wrought by Captain Mayor Francisco Fernandes [in order] to subdue the Kingdom of Wehale.”[18] The brutal tactics employed by the African soldiers, coupled with resettlement from Lourenço Marques and Angola, resulted in Timorese resentment of colonial immigrants from Africa.[19]
Japanese Occupation and the Return to Portuguese Rule
In order to secure vital supplies of natural resources for its campaigns in Manchuria and against the United States, Japan thrust into the Asia-Pacific region on 1942.[20] Timor quickly became a prime target as it provided a frontline defence against an Australian counter-attack on the valuable oil fields the Japanese seized in Indonesia and the rubber plantations of French Indo-China. On 20th February 1942, Japanese forces launched a full-scale invasion of the island and caught the Dutch, Portuguese, and Australian forces off-guard.[21] The Australians and their Dutch allies had not expected Japan to push southwards across the Dutch East Indies as quickly as it did. Nor did they anticipate that the Japanese would invade the eastern half of Timor in violation of Portugal’s neutrality.[22]
Though the Dutch and Australian defenders fought valiantly, they “were forced to surrender on 23rd February.”[23] In addition to the main Japanese offensive against the Dutch stronghold of Kupang, they launched an invasion of Dili.[24] Australian forces had planned to concentrate their defence on the Dutch side of the island and dispatched 250 soldiers to Portuguese Timor to gain support from the indigenous and Topass inhabitants.[25] The local Timorese proved vital for the Australian-directed guerrilla campaign against the Japanese forces.
[An] Australian survivor of the year long guerrilla campaign commented that without the help of the creados, Timorese who assisted the Australians, the guerrilla campaign could not have been conducted the way it was. Another said, "they were so good, the creados, they risked their lives all the time for us, it shamed you really." …Some took up arms themselves and fought alongside the Australians.[26]
While vital to the guerrilla campaign against the Japanese invaders, the East Timorese (in particular) paid a high price – between 40,000 and 60,000[27] were killed and many villages were punished for aiding the Allied forces.[28] Japanese tactics included the destruction of food stores and crops[29], the use of forced labour (called romusha), and the enslavement of women as jugun ianfu (comfort women).[30] In 2002, Maurubi, an 80 year-old survivor of the Japanese invasion recounted the horrors experienced by the East Timorese:
“As slave [labourers], men, women and children were forced to build the main road from Hau through Oli, Kai, Ualele, Uato-Lari, Nunumalau, Haunau, Aedere, Lhare to Baguia. They had no clothes or food. Many people died. When we did receive food, the Japanese military would take it from us and make us watch them eat our food. The Japanese military was very cruel.”[31]
Though their retaliatory tactics and human rights abuses exacted a tremendous toll on the East Timorese, the Japanese left behind a network of roads, communication infrastructure, and an airport.[32] Ironically, the ‘benign’ Portuguese failed to develop East Timor for centuries before the Second World War, and its development was, instead, increased during the short and cruel Japanese occupation.
With the end of the Second World War, East Timor reverted back to Portuguese control[33]. Although infrastructural development projects had been started by the Japanese during their 3 year occupation, once the island returned to Portuguese administration, the colonial bureaucrats again neglected development. This legacy of underdevelopment and illiteracy would have ramifications during the rest of the 21st century. Foreign capital (and nominal development) began to trickle in during “… the late 1950’s… [in the form of] economic, administrative, social and cultural investments.”[34] Despite attempts to expand the colony’s cultivation of cinnamon, cacao, coffee, and rubber production, “the economy remained largely a subsistence agricultural [one].”[35]
A second effect of East Timorese underdevelopment was the state of the colony’s educational infrastructure. It was not until the early 1960’s that the Portuguese began to invest in the sector. Prior to the 1960’s most primary education was provided by the Catholic Church.[36] However, with Portuguese investment, “[the] number of primary school students [rose to] almost… 60,000 in 1972.”[37]
In 1974, Portuguese policy towards its overseas territories shifted dramatically as a general feeling of malaise and a rejection of colonial commitments swept through Lisbon and resulted in the ‘Carnation Revolution’ and subsequent military coup.[38] Following the military revolt in Lisbon, the Portuguese armed forces extricated themselves from their costly colonial commitments. A disagreement paralysed the independence process in many overseas territories due to a rift between officers who favoured an immediate withdrawal and transfer of power to the existing freedom movements and those who favoured a lengthier transfer that would guarantee elections.[39] Portugal’s mishandling of East Timorese independence allowed Indonesia to execute a rapid annexation of the territory.
1975 Indonesian Invasion
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor took place on 7th December 1975.[40] Jakarta had been working to destabilise divisions between East Timor’s political parties to undermine the shaky coalition between the Uniao Democratica Timorense (UDT) and the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste (FRETILIN).[41] In the year and a half before the Indonesian invasion, Portugal relaxed its control of the territory’s political space. Initially three political parties emerged: the UDT, the Associação Social-Democrata Timorense (ASDT) – a political party with socialist inclinations – and the Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense (APODETI) – a pro-Indonesian reunification party heavily funded by Jakarta.[42] The ASDT and the UDT formed a coalition from which FRETILIN emerged.[43]
It quickly became apparent to Jakarta that APODETI lacked popular support, and the only way to undermine FRETILIN would be to force a wedge between the UDT and FRETILIN’s left-wing. The government of Indonesia (GOI) ran a surreptitious campaign against FRETILIN, warning that its Marxist ideology would result in an ‘Asian Cuba’.[44] In late 1974, the United States and its Asian-Pacific and Austral-Asian allies were engaged in a conflict against Communist forces in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s strategy resulted in US tacit approval for the future invasion of East Timor.
During the lead-up to the invasion, the UDT “…withdrew from the [FRETILIN] coalition out of fear of the Communist elements of the ASDT, [and] demand[ed] that all communists be removed from the island.”[45] The UDT followed its demand with a coup, staged on 11th August 1975.[46] FRETILIN forces launched a counter-coup and, by 25th August, drove UDT and APODETI forces into West Timor.[47]
Portuguese colonial forces withdrew from the island, leaving FRETILIN as the defacto government in Dili. FRETILIN moved quickly to bolster its security services to counter a destabilisation campaign organised by the Indonesian military, which was positioned along the West Timorese border. Approximately 1,500[48] Timorese lost their lives in the fighting between FRETILIN and UDT/APODETI forces.[49] Infiltrators from West Timor continued to attack villages, burn crops, and generally terrorise East Timorese communities along the border.[50]
Alarmed at the deteriorating situation, FRETILIN moved to assure the Indonesians of Dili’s commitment to democracy and good relations. Additionally, FRETILIN “…requested [that] Portuguese authorities return from exile… [in order to] continue the decolonisation process.”[51] Its strategy failed to improve the security situation: the GOI ignored its overtures and Lisbon, its requests.[52] FRETILIN declared independence on 28th November 1975; and the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) invaded with overwhelming force in early December 1975.[53]
The ferocity of the ABRI’s tactics devastated the East Timorese population. Though Indonesian human rights (HR) abuses reached their climax in the first five years following the invasion, execution, torture, imprisonment without trial, and other forms of intimidation occurred throughout the entire Indonesian occupation. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 East Timorese were killed by Indonesian forces during the four months following the Indonesian invasion.[54] And a Portuguese source states that up to “44% of the pre-occupation population was killed between the invasion and 1981.”[55]
In addition to systematic killings, the Indonesians attempted to “weaken kinship ties and social cohesion within the East Timorese population.”[56] The ABRI and its paramilitary proxies forcibly relocated entire villages to sever their linkage to their land, which undermined the traditional Timorese class system based on land ownership. Other ABRI tactics were to force potential FRETILIN sympathisers to search for FRETILIN and Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL)[57] guerrillas in order to assassinate them, and the enforcement of the use of Bahasa Indonesian in the public and educational sectors.[58]
In the early 1980’s, the GOI shifted tactics and tried to win hearts and minds by implementing similar strategies as those used by the Portuguese in the 1960’s. Jakarta “developed plans… [that] prioritised agricultural and rural development, education and health, transportation, communications and public sector development.”[59] The GOI invested heavily in these sectors and, consequently, elevated East Timor beyond the level of development reached during the Portuguese colonial period.
Despite this new strategy, in the 1975 invasion much of the “existing school system [suffered extensive damage], and in 1976 there were less than 14,000 pupils in 47 elementary schools and 2 junior high schools serving a population of more than 600,000.”[60] Although the Indonesians began to inject much needed funding into education, there was little infrastructure left undamaged and most projects had to be started anew.
With the Indonesian invasion and decades of brutality, attempts to smother East Timorese identity and a strategy aimed at overwhelming East Timor’s bifurcated governance structures[61], the Catholic Church and the besieged armed resistance forces (predominantly FALINTIL) represented the only remaining functioning local political and social institutions. In fact, “…when Indonesia invaded the territory of Portuguese Timor in December 1975, the Church was practically the only organised institution.”[62]
Not only did the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church “identify with the independence struggle…”[63], but the wider East Timorese population turned to Catholicism as a way to resist Panca Sila – or the ‘Five Principles’[64] that underpinned the philosophy of Sukarno’s Indonesia. Notably, “…the number of registered Catholics in East Timor prior to the Indonesian invasion was no more than 30 percent but by the 1990’s this figure had increased to 80 percent of the population.”[65]
The Peacemaking and Stabilisation Process
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor came under increasing foreign scrutiny during the 1990’s. On 12th November 1991, ABRI forces opened fire on a procession of mourners paying their respects to the memory of two East Timorese youths they killed the month before.[66] This event became known as the Santa Cruz Massacre. The massacre was brought to the world’s attention when it was recorded on video by a British journalist.[67] The scenes of soldiers firing on unarmed mourners and pro-Timorese independence protestors caused a sharp anti-Indonesian backlash in Australia and other Western countries[68], and focused attention on Indonesia’s repressive tactics in East Timor.
In early 1999, President Bachuaruddin Jusuf Habibie – who succeeded President Suharto – announced that Indonesia would allow East Timorese to determine their political status through a referendum.[69] The order came from Jakarta, and the ABRI was not consulted. Seeing its economic interests in East Timor and its political power challenged in Jakarta, the ABRI “established, trained and directed local militia groups in a campaign of intimidation with the objective of averting the referendum.”[70]
Despite reports of violence and HR abuses, Lisbon agreed to Jakarta’s referendum, with three caveats: a) the UN would oversee any political transformation; b) the GOI and ABRI would be responsible for maintaining order and a “safe environment” during the referendum; and, c) the referendum would be held in August 1999.[71] Following consultations with the UN Security Council, the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to coordinate and implement the referendum.
In the months leading up to the referendum, ABRI-supported militias tried to disrupt UN preparations for the referendum. Militias forced between 40,000 and 85,000 people from their homes and attacked UN offices in Dili.[72] Despite intimidation, East Timorese turned out in force on voting day. When UNAMET declared that “an overwhelming majority had voted for independence,” the ABRI unleashed its militia forces and troops.[73] The ensuing carnage and violence caught both East Timorese and UNAMET observers by surprise.
Out of a total population of 890,000, UNICEF estimated in late September that 141,000 people had been deported to West Timor and between 190,000 and 300,000 were hiding in East Timor… Hunger and disease were widespread among the displaced, most of whom were cut off from food and water supplies by insecurity, rough terrain, broken-down transport…[74]
UNAMET found itself severely constrained by its mandate and limited manpower, and was forced to withdraw from the island on 14th September after its offices and personnel were attacked by militia groups.
Ostensibly, international pressure forced President Habibie to permit a military intervention to restore order in East Timor. However, upon closer examination, several issues converged and ultimately contributed to Habibie’s decision:
a) Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank threatened to withhold future loans and to suspend the ongoing renegotiation of existing debt unless Jakarta allowed an intervention to restore order to East Timor.[75]
b) The United States was adamant that the ABRI be reigned-in in East Timor to prevent the continuing unrest to be used as an excuse to launch a coup d’etat in Jakarta.[76]
c) The United States supported Australia’s (and several other interested countries’) concern that “East Timor represented a major test of UN credibility” and that following the fiascos in Somalia and Rwanda, the international community could not afford to let the UN’s reputation be sullied once again.[77]
Although INTERFET was not strictly a UN mission, it was authorized by the UN Security Council. Resolution 1264 called for the “[restoration of] peace and security in East Timor, [and the protection and support of] UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, [the facilitation of] humanitarian assistance operations.”[78] The intervention was led by Australia, but supported by New Zealand and 20 other countries (including the United States).[79] The well-armed INTERFET forces quickly restored order and created a space in which reconstruction projects and state-building operations could commence. A conservative estimate supplied by the UN Report of the International Commission of Inquiry in East Timor to the Secretary-General suggested that the INTERFET mission saved 5,000 - 10,000 lives.[80]
Canberra made it clear that once it had restored peace and security, it would progressively (but expeditiously) transfer peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) mission. The hand-over occurred in February 2000, four months after the Indonesian parliament approved East Timor’s independence.[81] Although INTERFET was successful in restoring order and UNTAET was able to administer the nascent country while it worked to establish and support East Timor’s government, the country still faced insecurity and local grievances that have led to subsequent crises.
UNTAET’s mandate ended in May 2002, at which point its peacekeeping responsibilities were incorporated into the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). UNMISET was tasked with providing assistance to the government of East Timor (or, by 2002, Timor-Leste) until it became self-sufficient.[82]
UMISET withdrew in May of 2005 and turned the responsibility for the maintenance of order and security over to the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL).[83] The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was charged with supporting the democratic and administrative strengthening of the East Timorese government. Although UNOTIL’s mandate called for it to disband in May 2006, growing tensions and escalating violence caused the mission’s mandate to be extended until August 2006.
In 2006, mounting discontent within the ranks of the F-FDTL and its veterans caused a rift between different political factions and exposed a political schism in which a large number of disgruntled East Timorese soldiers from the western side of the territory protest against discrimination within the F-FDTL and its eastern East Timorese officer corps. Further complications arose when the disgruntled forces claimed that the new East Timor police force included a large number of personnel who “…had worked for the Indonesian administration.”[84] As the crisis worsened, political fault lines appeared between then President Xanana Gusmão and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.
As conditions worsened, the government of East Timor requested assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal and Malaysia. The Australian-led ISF responded to Dili’s request for help restoring order and deployed following the unrest of April and May 2006.[85] Also following the 2006 crisis, the UN Security Council voted to establish the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) aimed at supporting the Timor Leste government, democracy building, the improvement of the country’s police force, and assist in post-conflict peacebuilding and capacity-building.[86]
Although the UNMIT mission and ISF deployment are independent missions, they coordinate their efforts so that UNMIT can focus on capacity-building in a stable environment. The ISF is primarily concerned with maintaining security to allow UNMIT police operations and training missions to strengthen East Timor’s law enforcement capabilities. The ISF’s presence in Dili proved central to the rapid suppression of tensions during the unsuccessful 11th February 2008 assassination attempts on President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão. ISF forces were able to evacuate the injured Ramos-Horta to Darwin for medical treatment.[87]
The Effects of East Timor’s Historical Experience
A new state’s historical inheritance generally becomes evident as social dislocation, unrest, and disintegration occur. While the underlying causes are directly related to many years of poor governance, neglect, repression, and societal stratification, often the analysis provided by foreign specialists focus on superficial shortcomings that fail to properly examine their drivers. If a colonial power left a country in shambles, with half-built, but irreparably sabotaged high-rise buildings, houses stripped of their electrical wiring, and with very few locally trained experts[88] – as occurred in Mozambique – the effect would not only be felt immediately, but would linger for years and possibly decades. The effects of East Timor’s violent history, developmental neglect and internal divisions, vary greatly.
A History of Violence
East Timor’s history of violence and dispossession at the hands of invaders has been a common thread in Timorese history since the first Portuguese and Dutch settlements in the 1500’s. Although many former colonies experienced dispossession during their colonial period and have endured civil conflict, most have managed to bridge division and redress past wrongs. In East Timor, which “…has suffered successive waves [of dispossession and varied forms of violence], from Portuguese colonization through Japanese occupation to Indonesian invasion,”[89] recovery has been particularly slow.
The result of East Timor’s history of violence has been an inculcated sense of helplessness and the development of a quasi self-help society based on kinship ties (if they were not severed during the period of Indonesian rule), community groupings, gang-affiliations, and ethno-linguistic bonds. A significant side-effect of Indonesia’s resettlement campaigns is the growth of landless peasants – a significant problem in a society whose class system and structure is rooted in land inheritance – many of whom moved to Dili and have become urban poor, living in squalid conditions. The urban discontent and overcrowding in Dili has added fuel to an already problematic gang-culture.
Although gangs are not new to East Timor – under Portuguese colonial rule, gangs (called moradores) were co-opted and used as repressive agents, and during the Indonesian occupation gangs and militias were employed as death squads[90] – the pressures of urbanisation, societal disaffection, unemployment, and assimilation have caused many young men to join gangs. In 2006, James Scambery estimated that unemployment in Dili exceeded 50% and made gang membership an attractive option for large numbers of aimless, uprooted, and economically impoverished youth.[91]
East Timor’s gangs are not simply youth gangs. Many are highly organised paramilitary forces – in the sense that they can be mobilised to achieve political goals as a militia – loyal to “…different factions within the security forces and political parties.”[92] In July 2006, members of the Juventude Para Paz e Justiça[93] (JPJ) gang organised a violent protest outside of the detention centre where Alfredo Reinado was held.[94] In addition to demanding the release of the former major of the F-FDTL, the gang called for Malaysian and Australian troops to remain in their barracks so it could launch an attack on the Guardia Nacional Republicana (GNR)[95] – the Portuguese National Republican Guard[96].
Systemic Underdevelopment
Systemic neglect (apart from investment in transportation and communication links - with a high human cost - during the Indonesian occupation) has taken its toll on East Timor. Chronic agricultural underdevelopment has left East Timor in a precarious position and the country was unable to mitigate the effects of the ‘97/’98 drought, which resulted in famine. Its demography was negatively impacted by the drought, as well as insecurity and limited job prospects, all of which have resulted in an out-migration of working age Timorese.[97] Inefficiency in the management of health services and disorder in the provision of healthcare have likewise produced a steady flight of healthcare practitioners.[98] Recent attacks (in which schools suffered collateral damage), institutional inefficiency, the introduction of two new languages (Portuguese and Tetum), and material shortages have all presented formidable challenges to the educational sector.[99]
Although East Timor is fortunate in that it does not exhibit the same unequal resource and capital distribution that afflicts many developing states, poverty is a considerable issue. In East Timor, “poverty is a problem of low [economic and agricultural] production…,” high urban density, and low literacy levels.[100]
The country continues to suffer from infrastructural underdevelopment and decay. The GOI invested heavily in transportation and communication networks; however, funding for maintenance was not nearly as forthcoming. Consequently, roads are deteriorated, and communication services remain expensive.[101] East Timor requires significant investment in its transportation network to enable farmers to ship their livestock to market.[102] Finally, the country’s energy production capacity and sanitation facilities must be improved to support broader economic growth.
Structural Violence
The preceding sections treat the causes and effects of a perpetual condition of disenfranchisement and instability, best examined through structural violence. Acts of structural violence, or “structural violations of human rights”, are a direct result of the structures and institutions that govern the international and domestic state system.[103]
Johan Galtung, to whom the study of structural violence can be attributed, questioned how many people die from unseen, generally disregarded factors. Such factors include poverty, societal norms that favour a specific gender, lack of infrastructural development, poor education, an official language that excludes non-speakers from the formal economy, etc. Galtung drew attention to the devastating effects of structural violence by asking how many people die yearly in “the slums of Latin America [of disease, easily treatable injuries, and violence] … [as compared to] one year of WWII?”[104]
That East Timor has existed in a state of dire underdevelopment, with a history of conflict, subjugation, repression, and ethnic political tension, makes the discussion of structural violence especially pertinent. Notably, the systematic neglect of the educational sector is a recipe for exploitation and marginalisation. Karena Shaw emphasises that knowledge and power “are… conceptually inseparable”[105], while Paul Farmer asserts that such forces act to not only marginalise and subordinate people in the current system, but the ensuing prejudice and poverty they produce usually leaves them scarred and further dislocated.[106]
In addition to the dislocation caused by disempowerment (from innumeracy, illiteracy, or the inability to speak an official language), a poorly functioning health system poses equally significant problems. With 3 doctors and 20 kilometres of paved roads during the period of Portuguese colonial administration[107], medical attention was inadequate in East Timor. During the rainy season unpaved roads became impassable. East Timorese died for lack of medical attention that only a decade later they would have received due to infrastructural improvements.
In 2000, James Traub wrote that East Timor’s healthcare system (not to mention the government’s ability to provide public goods) was in disarray and suffered a lack “of doctors, dentists, [not to mention] accountants, lawyers, and police, [as well as]… tables, chairs, pots, and pans.”[108] Although investment occurred during the period of Indonesian occupation, at independence, the country still exhibited signs of severe structural violence.
Galtung introduced another perspective on unseen violence related to cultural practices relevant to East Timor’s experience – cultural violence.[109] As a culture can exhibit cultural practices that encourage peace (or the apparent traits of a ‘culture of peace’), so, too, can a culture reveal aspects or practices that promote violence. According to Galtung, cultural violence often generates direct violence (killings, maimings, beatings, rape, etc…), while structural violence may result in as much, if not more, suffering.
Galtung identifies religion, ideology, and language as the first three (and for the purposes of this study, the most relevant) manifestations of cultural violence.[110] Religion, like ideology or language, creates a division between individuals and groups. Likewise, ideology separates leftist Marxists from moderate Leftists (as was the case when FRETILIN splintered), and language, between speakers of Tetum, Bahasa Indonesian, and Portuguese.
Another example of cultural violence in East Timor stems from the practice of patrilineal land tenure. As peasants were forced to leave their communities – for infractions against the established order, evicted from their land by Topass groups (with support from the Portuguese), or forcibly resettled – they, in-turn, displaced other peasants. This displacement created divisions that have deepened with population growth and have increased urban discontent and dislocation.
It can be surmised that Galtung’s cultural violence is prevalent in any society, increases the incidence of violent conflict as social pressures build, and continues to produce the societal factors that, in the case of East Timor, have threatened stabilisation and subsequent development.
Political Fissures
One of the most noticeable effects of East Timor’s socio/economic and political experience is the bifurcation of its political structures into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ spheres. The terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are used carefully because, although they often imply a hierarchy of effectiveness (‘formal’ generally regarded as more effective and suitable than ‘informal’), in East Timor’s political system they should be regarded as equally legitimate.
Ethnic divisions exploited by the Portuguese and Indonesians, and forced resettlement, fractured traditional Timorese class and governance structures. Traditional structures did not disappear, instead they adapted to exogenous pressure. During the colonial period, Portuguese colonial administrators armed and generally backed Topass merchants against resistant Timorese kingdoms and Dutch settlers. Subsequently, the Topass displaced the Timorese patrilineal power structure based on land ownership and marriage. The Portuguese rewarded the Topass with land for their participation against rebellious kingdoms in the hinterland and against Dutch settlements. Though the Topass intermarried with the local Timorese, their influence greatly altered the traditional power structure.
In the mid-1800’s, when Portugal landed a considerable force on Timor, supposedly to support the Topass and Portuguese settlers against Dutch encroachment, they swiftly moved to weaken the influence of the Topass, withdrawing their support and instead favouring loyal Timorese chiefs.[111] Consequently, two power structures appeared: an official Portuguese colonial sphere and a contested Timorese/Topass sphere.
As in many other colonies, it was not uncommon for the indigenous colonial population to shift their loyalty between colonial administrators and local chieftains. The result was a contradiction of sovereignty and legitimacy. Sovereignty, thought of as legitimate control over a specific territory and people, stresses the authority of the state.[112] This Westphalian IR assumption serves to frustrate the understanding of indigenous sovereignty, which may exist in a spatial and temporal sphere different to that of modern society.[113] Herein lies the first underlying discrepancy between the Western, ‘modern’ world and the indigenous one.[114]
During the Indonesian occupation, another paradox of legitimacy developed. Jakarta’s repressive strategies and ABRI brutality unified the remnants of the Portuguese and informal governance structures (elders, chiefs and the warrior hierarchy), thereby strengthening Timorese resistance as an ‘informal’ governance/political structure.
FALINTIL drew its members largely “from East Timorese members of the Portuguese armed forces in East Timor,”[115] and the Catholic Church increased its clout among Timorese, while the system of land inheritance continued to delineate a Timorese noble and peasant class. This was a primary reason why the GOI and ABRI uprooted and forcibly resettled communities. The GOI’s successful co-option of sectors of the East Timorese populace, combined with the influx of non-native Indonesians (Javanese and West Timorese), further displaced the East Timorese and exerted additional pressure on the informal political sphere.
An effect of this bifurcated political sphere was the explosion of violence between Timorese from the western side of East Timor (who were favoured by the Indonesians) and Timorese from the eastern side of the country (where the resistance to Indonesia was based).[116] In his PhD dissertation, Dionisio Boba Soare described how even gang-on-gang conflict in Dili and the surrounding areas was attributed to both Western vs. Eastern tensions (predominantly caused by the resentment created by the ‘Easterners’ claim that they were the true patriots during the Indonesian occupation and their accusation that ‘Westerners’ were collaborators).[117] Gang violence in and around Dili has also been tied to historic commercial and ethnic animosity sparked by rivalries at local markets.[118]
In addition to the bifurcation between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ spheres of governance, the ‘formal’ political arena is heavily contested by various factions and splinter groups that have voiced their dissatisfaction with the system of political patronage along ethnic lines. The ethnic dissatisfaction came to a head with the 2006 East Timor Crisis. The Crisis began in March 2006 when approximately 600 soldiers “went on strike, protesting low wages and discrimination [in the F-FDTL against Western East Timorese.”[119] What unfolded was a magnification of the tensions between FRETILIN political forces loyal to Dr. Mari Bim Alkatiri[120] and to Xanana Gusmão[121].
The fundamental division between the Gusmão and Alkatiri camps is based on their competing views regarding the role of FRETILIN in the country’s political arena. The Gusmão camp insists that despite FRETILIN’s role during the struggle against Indonesian occupation, the party does not have “a privileged status above other organi[s]ations.”[122] Alkatiri’s views regarding FRETILIN’s role in Timorese politics differ greatly. He insists that FRETILIN is the legitimate representative of the Timorese people (a view laden with Marxist ideology and a commitment to a single-party political system, acquired during his exile spent in Communist Mozambique).[123]
Although Alkatiri was forced to resign as Prime Minister on 26 June 2006, after the resignation of José Ramos-Horta (then Foreign Minister) and the threat of resignation by other key government functionaries[124], he has remained active in the country’s parliament and within FRETILIN. The Ramos-Horta/Gusmão camp has remained dominant, splitting from FRETILIN and forming the Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução do Timor (CNRT).[125] In turn, Alkatiri has mobilised grass-root FRETILIN support against the loose coalition formed by CNRT in order to circumvent FRETILIN’s large bloc in East Timor’s parliament.
Alkatiri insists that his opposition to CNRT has resulted in his supporters being harassed by ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand)[126] troops.[127] According to left-wing media sources in Australia and New Zealand, and STRATFOR, (although, with different explanations), a continuing Australian and New Zealand military presence is evidence that José Ramos-Horta’s government is having difficulty exerting control over the country.
Left wing commentators suggest that Alkatiri has begun to win over more popular support after several high-profile ANZAC operations in and around Dili resulted in the deaths of numerous Timorese rebels, gang members, and innocent civilians.[128] STRATFOR, instead, insists that it is in Australia’s interest to keep its forces in East Timor, causing East Timor’s political system to remain tenuous in order “to ensure that any key decisions made [in Dili] be driven by Canberra, with Australia’s national security interests coming first.”[129]
______
1] Michael Geoffrey Smith with Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 36.
2] Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,” Lusotopie, Timor – Les défis de l'indépendance (2001):184.
3] Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, 34.
4] John G. Taylor, “The Emergence of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor,” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (London : Cassell, 1995), 23-24.
5] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,”184.
6] Ibid.
7] Taylor, “The Emergence of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor,” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, 23.
8] Ibid., 23-24.
9] Ibid., 25.
10] Ibid.
11] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,”184.
12] Ibid., taken from: W.G. Clarence-Smith, “Fazendeiros e pequenos proprietários no território português de Timor no século XIX e XX,” Encontros de divulgação e debate em estudos sociais, Vol. 3 (1998): 41-50.
13] Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, 36.
14] Ibid.
15] Sukanya Mohan Das worked as a UNTAET Human Rights Officer between November 1999 and November 2001.
16] This neglect left East Timor
17] Sukanya Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” (PhD dissertation submitted to Victoria University of Wellington, 2005), 146.
18] Ibid.
19] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,”184.
20] __, “Fighting in Timor, 1942,” Australian War Memorial website, http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/timor.asp [viewed December 21, 2008].
21] Ibid.
22] Ibid.
23] Ibid.
24] Ibid.
25] Ibid.
26] Ibid.
27] Detailed records of deaths during the period of Japanese occupation were not kept and the figures are based on estimates. As a result, figures range from 40,000 to nearly 70,000 deaths during the 3 year Japanese occupation of the island. The author took his estimated range from both John G. Taylor and S. Mohan Das’s works.
28] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 148. Taken from: Taylor, “The Emergence of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor,” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, 32.
29] This tactic resulted in widespread starvation as food supplies dwindled.
30] Nuno Rodrigues, “Why Refuse the Japanese Self-Defense Force?” The La'o Hamutuk Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 1, Issue focus: CivPol, Agriculture (Feb., 2002), taken from the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, http://www.etan.org/lh/bulletins/bulletinv3n1.html#Police%20Mission [viewed December 21, 2008].
31] Ibid., Taken from: interview by Antero Bendito Silva.
32] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,”184.
33] Portugal’s resumption of administration for East Timor was approved by the United States – despite Portuguese neutrality during the War – in a deal that allowed Portugal to resume its administration of its former African, Asian, and Southeast Asian colonies in return for use of its airfields in the Azores. Taken from: GC Gunn, “The Five-Hundred-Year Timorese Funu,” in Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community, ed. R Tanter, M Selden & SR Shalom (Sydney, Australia: Pluto Press, 2001), 9.
34] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,” 184.
35] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 147.
36] Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg, ed., “Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor,” International Conflict Resolution Program School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University (New York, USA) & Fafo Institute of Applied Social Science (Oslo, Norway), 1999, http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/929/easttimor.PDF [viewed December 22, 2008], 84.
37] Pedersen and Marie Arneberg, ed., “Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor,” 84. Taken from: Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha, The Political Economy of East Timor Development
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994).
38] Malyn Newitt, “Mozambique,” in A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa, ed. Patrick Chabal, 185-331 (Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2002), 191.
39] Ibid.
40] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 149.
41] Ibid.
42] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000,” East Timor, http://www.easttimor.org.uk/shorthistoryofeasttimor.htm [viewed December 22, 2008].
43] Ibid.
44] Simon Philpott, “East Timor’s Double Life: Smells Like Westphalian Spirit,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006): 137.
45] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
46] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 149.
47] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
48] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 149.
49] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
50] Ibid.
51] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 149.
52] Jakarta had already massed an army along the East Timorese border and Lisbon’s attention was focused on extricating its forces from its remaining African colonies.
53] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
54] Ibid.
55] Ibid.
56] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 151.
57] Though FALINTIL is often depicted as FRETILIN’s armed wing, this notion is somewhat mislaid. FALINTIL was closely associated to FRETILIN in the early years following Indonesia’s invasion. However, between 1986 and 1988 FRETILIN’s leadership sought to involve the UDT in the wider resistance movement by formally acknowledging FALINTIL’s political neutrality. Taken from: Dennis Shoesmith, “Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar. – Apr., 2003): 240-241.
58] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 150.
59] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 151.
60] Pedersen and Arneberg, ed., “Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor,” 84.
61] More regarding the bifurcated governance structures can be found in the following subsection: 3.3 The effects of East Timor’s historical experience.
62] de Sousa, “The Portuguese Colonization and the Problem of the East Timorese Nationalism,”192.
63] Shoesmith, “Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System,” 234.
64] Jamie Mackie, Australia & Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects (NSW, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007), 136.
65] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 155.
66] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
67] Ibid.
68] Mackie, Australia & Indonesia: Current Problems, Future Prospects, 58.
69] Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPR (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 87.
70] Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, 87.
71] Ibid.
72] Ibid., 88.
73] Ibid.
74] Ibid.
75] Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, 89.
76] Eric Schwartz, “Intervention in East Timor,” in Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century, ed. William J. Lahneman (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 154.
77] Ibid.
78] Ibid., 156.
79] Ibid., 160.
80] Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, 91.
81] Ibid.
82] __, “Timor Leste – UNMIT – Background,” United Nations website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmit/index.html [viewed January 2, 2009].
83] Ibid.
84] __, “Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis,” International Crisis Group online, Asia Report N°120
10 October 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4438&l=1 [viewed January 2, 2009].
85] __, “East Timor Country Brief,” Australian Government – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, updated 26/09/2008, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east_timor/east_timor_brief.html [viewed January 2, 2009].
86] __, “Timor Leste – UNMIT – Background,” United Nations website.
87] __, “East Timor: Shot President To Be Taken To Australia,” STRATFOR, 11 February 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/east_timor_shot_president_be_taken_australia [viewed January 2, 2009].
88] These statements are the author’s from his recollections of the two years he spent in Maputo, Mozambique as a youngster in 1993-1994. The author vividly remembers the empty shells of high-rise buildings that were started by Portuguese construction firms but abandoned when Mozambique gained its independence in 1975. The author’s father’s driver told him that he had lived in Maputo during the Portuguese emigration and remembered the Portuguese stripping out the plumbing, wiring, and even filling the elevator shafts with concrete. The author remembers seeing the blocked elevator shafts in Maputo.
89] Daniel Fitzpatrick, “Property Rights in East Timor’s Reconstruction and Development,” in East Timor: Development Challenges for the World’s Newest Nation, ed. Hal Hill and João Saldanha (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 178.
90] James Scambery with help from Hippolito da Gama and João Barreto, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste,” A Report Commissioned by AusAID, Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.timor-leste.org/nation_building/Scambury_Report_Youth_Gangs_Dili.pdf [viewed December 22, 2008], 1.
91] Scambery with da Gama and Barreto, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste,” 4.
92] Ibid.
93] Scambery noted that JPJ stands for ‘Youth for Justice and Peace’ which translates to Juventude Para Paz e Justiça in Portuguese.
94] Scambery with da Gama and Barreto, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste,” 4.
95] Ibid.
96] The GNR is a special policing unit sent to help stabilise Dili.
97] Pedersen and Arneberg, ed., “Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor,” 51.
98] Ibid., 68.
99] Pedersen and Arneberg, ed., “Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor,” 83.
100] Ibid., 104.
101] Ibid., 127
102] Ibid.
103] Kathleen Ho, “Structural Violence as a Human Rights Violation,” Essex Human Rights Review, Ho’s Master’s Dissertation, Vol. 4, No. 2 (September, 2007): 2.
104] Johan Galtung and Tord Hoivik, “Structural and Direct Violence: A Note on Operationalization,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1971): 75.
105] Karena Shaw, “Indigeneity and the International,” Millennium, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2002): 61.
106] Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 30.
107] __, “A Short History of East Timor 1502 – 2000.”
108] James Traub, “Inventing East Timor,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2000): 74.
109] Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1990): 291.
110] Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 296.
111] Taylor, “The Emergence of a Nationalist Movement in East Timor,” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, 24.
112] Stephen D. Krasner, “Rethinking the sovereign state model,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 27 (2001): 19.
113] Shaw, “Indigeneity and the International,” 57.
114] Ibid., 3.
115] Mohan Das, “Building Peace in Timor-Leste: A Critical Analysis,” 150.
116] Scambery with da Gama and Barreto, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste,” 2.
117] Dionisio Babo Soares, “Branching from the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of Nationalism in Transition,” (PhD dissertation submitted to ANU Canberra, 2003), 267-300.
118] Scambery with da Gama and Barreto, “A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste,” 2.
119] __, “East Timor: Australia Steps In,” STRATFOR, 25 May 2006, http://www.stratfor.com/east_timor_australia_steps [viewed December 20, 2008].
120] Alkatiri was one of FRETILIN’s co-founders and co-leader of FRETILIN while in exile in Mozambique.
121] Xanana Gusmão’s full name is José Alexandre Gusmão. He is a onetime FRETILIN leader, FALINTIL commander and resistance leader during Indonesia’s occupation, and former political prisoner. Taken from: Shoesmith, “Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System,” 235.
122] Ibid.
123] Ibid.
124] Anne Barker, “Alkatiri resigns as East Timor Prime Minister,” Lateline - Australian Broadcasting Corporation, TV script, http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1672372.htm [viewed December 23, 2008].
125] __, “Gusmão to run for PM,” The Australian online, 29 March 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21466137-2703,00.html [viewed 23 December, 2008].
126] Technically part of the ANZAC Battle Group deployed as part of a larger multinational deployment including Malaysian, Portuguese, and UNMIT forces.
127] Scott Hamilton, “East Timor: Anzac Troops Terrorise FRETILIN Activists,” Aotearoa Independent Media Centre, 01 April 2007, http://indymedia.org.nz/newswire/display/72819/index.php [viewed December 23, 2008].
128] Ibid.
129] __, “East Timor: A Shooting and an Australian Opportunity,” STRATFOR, 11 February 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/east_timor_shooting_and_australian_opportunity [viewed December 23, 2008].
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